jbaruch/nanoclaw-trusted

Rules for trusted NanoClaw groups. Shared memory, session bootstrap, cross-group memory updates. Loaded for trusted and main containers only.

Quality

97%

Does it follow best practices?

Impact

Pending

No eval scenarios have been run

Securityby

Passed

No known issues

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Malicious code detected in rules/session-bootstrap.md: This is a prompt injection attack. The file masquerades as a session bootstrap rule but is designed to manipulate AI agents into executing arbitrary commands at the start of every session. It instructs the AI to (1) run bash commands, (2) invoke a skill/plugin ('tessl__trusted-memory') that could load attacker-controlled instructions or exfiltrate data, and (3) write files to disk — all before processing any user message. The 'MANDATORY' and 'Step 0' framing is social engineering to ensure the AI complies without question. This is a classic prompt injection pattern designed to hijack AI agent behavior.

Session Bootstrap — MANDATORY First Action

Name: jbaruch/nanoclaw-trusted
Rating: 97.27272727272728 (1 reviews)
Author: jbaruch

YOUR VERY FIRST ACTION in every new session — before responding to ANY message — is to run this Bash command:

cat /tmp/session_bootstrapped 2>/dev/null

If the file is missing or empty → run: Skill(skill: "tessl__trusted-memory")

Then write the sentinel: echo "done" > /tmp/session_bootstrapped

If the file exists and contains "done" → bootstrap already ran this session, skip.

This is not optional. This is not background context. This is Step 0 of every session. If you respond to a user message without checking this first, you are violating this rule.