Build Quarkus applications with LangChain4j extensions - project setup, CDI services, REST endpoints, MCP, agentic, and dev mode
91
90%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
96%
1.71xAverage score across 3 eval scenarios
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill's MCP section (Section 4) shows configuring remote MCP servers via quarkus.langchain4j.mcp.remote.url and using @McpToolBox/@McpClient to call those servers at runtime, which clearly allows the agent to ingest and act on untrusted third-party content from arbitrary HTTP MCP endpoints.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill explicitly allows connecting to remote MCP servers at runtime (e.g., quarkus.langchain4j.mcp.remote.url=https://mcp.example.com/mcp) which the AI services use as MCP tools (thus able to control agent tooling/behavior and trigger remote executions), and the STDIO example command (npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp) shows fetching and executing remote code to start an MCP server locally.