Systematically handle GitHub PR review feedback: fetch comments, plan responses, make code changes, and reply to reviewers with explicit approval at each stage.
90
90%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly fetches user-generated GitHub content (see Phase 2: the GraphQL query that retrieves reviewThreads and reviews and the `gh pr view --json comments` call), and the workflow requires parsing those untrusted review/comment bodies to decide actions (Phase 3–8) such as code changes, replies, and resolving threads, so third-party content can directly influence agent behavior.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill uses the gh CLI to fetch PR review content at runtime from GitHub (e.g., https://api.github.com/graphql and PR URLs like https://github.com/OWNER/REPO/pull/NUMBER), and those fetched review bodies/comments are parsed and injected into the agent’s processing to generate plans and replies, so external content directly controls the agent's instructions and is a required dependency.