pleaseai/bun
All-in-one JavaScript/TypeScript toolkit: fast runtime, package manager, test runner, and bundler. Version-aware skill backed by the ask CLI.
75
94%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
—
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.85). The skill’s runtime workflow uses `ask src "github:oven-sh/bun@${BUN_REF}"` / `ask docs ...` to fetch Bun source/docs from GitHub (public web content) and injects that readable text into the agent context, which is outsider-authored free text.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill includes a runtime installation command that fetches and executes remote code via curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash, and it also relies on runtime fetches of the repository via ask (github:oven-sh/bun@${BUN_REF}) to drive API verification and generated code, so external content is fetched/executed and directly influences the agent's behavior.
- Audited
- Security analysis