Review PR comments, address code issues in source files (not generated files), regenerate derived artifacts, run lint/format, commit, push, and reply to the comment thread confirming resolution.
92
90%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
97%
1.21xAverage score across 5 eval scenarios
Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The skill explicitly fetches and reads user-generated PR content via the "Identify the PR and fetch PR feedback" workflow (e.g., `gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{pr_number}/comments`, issues comments, and reviews) and uses those third-party review bodies to decide edits, commits, and replies, so untrusted reviewer text could inject instructions that affect the agent's actions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill issues runtime GitHub API calls (e.g., "gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{pr_number}/comments") to fetch reviewer comments that are ingested as instructions to the agent and thus remote content can directly control agent behavior.