Daily AI research pipeline → Obsidian vault. Scans Reddit + X for agents, skills, models, MCP, RAG topics. Deduplicates against vault history, writes structured daily notes. Tag
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91%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.85). The skill explicitly scans public social media (Reddit and X) as described in SKILL.md/README and implemented in scripts/run.py (using openai_reddit and xai_x), fetches arbitrary webpage content in scripts/lib/promote_v2.py via _fetch_url_content, and passes that untrusted, user-generated content into LLM prompts for synthesis and note creation—allowing third‑party content to directly influence tool actions and outputs.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The promote pass fetches arbitrary external pages at runtime (see promote_v2._fetch_url_content which opens item URLs matching the pattern https?://[^\)]+ extracted from daily notes) and injects that page content directly into the LLM prompt (_summarize_with_llm), so remote content can control model output.
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