Automate Anthropic Admin tasks via Rube MCP (Composio). Always search tools first for current schemas.
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill's required workflow explicitly instructs the agent to call RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS (and related Rube/Composio endpoints) to fetch current tool schemas, slugs, and recommended execution plans from external MCP/Composio services, and those fetched artifacts are then used to decide which tools and arguments to execute—exposing the agent to third-party content that can influence actions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill requires adding and querying the MCP endpoint https://rube.app/mcp at runtime (e.g., via RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS) to fetch tool schemas and recommended execution plans that directly control agent instructions and tool invocations, so this external URL is a runtime dependency that can control the agent.
2790447
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