Automate Appointo tasks via Rube MCP (Composio). Always search tools first for current schemas.
67
53%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./composio-skills/appointo-automation/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill requires calling RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS against the external Rube MCP endpoint (e.g., https://rube.app/mcp) to fetch tool slugs, input schemas, and recommended execution plans from a third-party service, and those untrusted tool descriptions are then used to drive RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL calls—thus allowing external content to materially influence agent actions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill requires connecting to and calling the Rube MCP endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp) at runtime—RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS/RUBE_MANAGE_CONNECTIONS fetch tool schemas and recommended execution plans from that server which directly control the agent's actions and are required for operation.
2790447
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.