autonomous-agent-patterns
Design patterns for building autonomous coding agents. Covers tool integration, permission systems, browser automation, and human-in-the-loop workflows. Use when building AI agents, designing tool APIs, implementing permission systems, or creating autonomous coding assistants.
69
Quality
68%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./.agent/skills/autonomous-agent-patterns/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 1 critical severity, 2 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill contains several high-risk patterns that enable intentional abuse—automatic file reads added to prompts, tools that can run shell commands (with shell=True), and an MCP create_tool flow that writes and hot-reloads LLM-generated Python code—collectively enabling easy data exfiltration and remote code execution if misused.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly fetches and ingests arbitrary URLs into agent context (sub-skills/51-context-injection-patterns.md add_url) and also browses and extracts page content/screenshots for LLM-driven actions (sub-skills/41-browser-tool-pattern.md and 4.2 VisualAgent), which are then fed into prompts and used to decide/carry out actions, enabling indirect prompt injection from untrusted third-party content.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 1.00). The ContextManager.add_url method performs requests.get(url) at runtime and injects the fetched page content into the LLM prompt (i.e., any URL passed to ContextManager.add_url / requests.get(url) can directly control agent prompts), so URLs fetched via that call are high-risk.
- Repository
- Dokhacgiakhoa/antigravity-ide
- Commit
3395991
- Audited
- Security analysis
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