coding-agent
Delegate coding tasks to Codex, Claude Code, or Pi agents via background process. Use when: (1) building/creating new features or apps, (2) reviewing PRs (spawn in temp dir), (3) refactoring large codebases, (4) iterative coding that needs file exploration. NOT for: simple one-liner fixes (just edit), reading code (use read tool), or any work in ~/clawd workspace (never spawn agents here). Requires a bash tool that supports pty:true.
80
77%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/coding-agent/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 1 critical severity, 2 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill contains multiple high-risk, deliberate operational patterns—explicit sandbox-disabling flags (--yolo, --full-auto), an "elevated" host-execution option, background interactive agents with PTY and remote command/control (process:write/submit/kill), guidance to run package installers and auto-commit/push, and an explicit auto-notify shell command—any of which can be abused for remote code execution, data exfiltration, credential theft, and supply-chain compromise.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly clones and fetches public GitHub repos and PR refs (e.g., "git clone https://github.com/user/repo.git $REVIEW_DIR" and "git fetch origin '+refs/pull/*/head:refs/remotes/origin/pr/*'") and then runs coding agents (e.g., `codex review`, `codex exec 'Review PR #...'`, background agents) to read and act on that user-generated third-party content, so untrusted web content can influence tool behavior and next actions.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.70). The prompt does not explicitly ask for sudo, user creation, or editing system configs, but it repeatedly encourages running unsandboxed/elevated agents (e.g. --yolo, elevated:true, host execution) and running arbitrary install/command sequences that can modify the host state, so it meaningfully pushes the agent toward compromising the machine.
- Repository
- Hung-Reo/hungreo-openclaw
- Commit
e893157
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.