Use when building, extending, or debugging FastMCP v3 Python MCP servers. Activates on FastMCP tool/resource/prompt creation, provider and transform implementation (CodeMode, Tool Search), auth setup (MultiAuth, PropelAuth, KeycloakProvider), client SDK usage, FastMCPApp and Generative UI server building, fastmcp-slim client-only installs, nginx reverse proxy deployment, Prefab Apps, OTEL observability, and testing. Grounded in local v3.3 docs — zero speculation.
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
In `references/advanced.md`, the runtime path `@mcp.tool(..., task=True)` / `ctx.elicit()` accepts user/client-provided free-text during tool execution and can then be processed by the LLM/agent logic, making indirect prompt-injection possible via that input.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The HTML UI resources in references/apps.md import and execute the JavaScript SDK from https://unpkg.com/@modelcontextprotocol/ext-apps@0.4.0/app-with-deps at runtime (served in ui:// resources), so this external URL is fetched during skill runtime and executes remote code in the host iframe.
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