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lockbit

LockBit / generic RaaS-affiliate adversary-emulation playbook — broker/edge/RDP initial access, beacon, AD compromise to Domain Admin, defense evasion (Defender-disable via GPO, shadow-copy deletion), bulk exfil, then canary double-extortion encryption (Windows + ESXi). Reusable template for any ransomware affiliate (ALPHV, Akira, Black Basta). Triggers on: 'emulate LockBit', 'ransomware affiliate', 'RaaS', 'double extortion', 'StealBit', 'domain-wide ransomware', 'ESXi locker'.

Quality

90%

Does it follow best practices?

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Adds up to 20 points to the overall score

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SecuritybySnyk

Passed

No findings from the security scan

SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Quality

Content

78%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.

A strong, tightly written emulation playbook: concrete seed artifacts, a phase-by-phase skill map, explicit safety gates for the destructive steps, and honest fidelity-deviation notes. The main weaknesses are minor — a redundant flow recap and dated CTI in the intro, an odd routing of the exfil/impact phases to the reporting skill, and no verify-after-action feedback loops around the gated operations.

Suggestions

Trim the intro blockquote's flow restatement (it duplicates the kill-chain table) and the dated CTI asides ('most prolific RaaS of 2022-2023', 'Operation Cronos in Feb 2024') to save tokens without losing guidance.

Re-map kill-chain rows 9 (Exfiltration, T1567.002) and 10 (Impact, T1486): both currently point to post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md — route them to the actual exfiltration and canary-encryptor skills, or explain why reporting owns those phases.

Add explicit verify-before/after checkpoints for the gated operations, e.g. 'confirm canary host set and rollback plan before GPO deployment' and 'verify GPO settings restored after rollback' in the Deconfliction section.

DimensionReasoningScore

Conciseness

The body is dense and well structured (tables, JSON seed, short sections) with no explanations of concepts Claude already knows, but the intro blockquote's flow recap ('The flow: cheap initial access ... → encrypt Windows + ESXi') duplicates the kill-chain table, and dated CTI asides ('most prolific RaaS of 2022-2023', 'disrupted by Operation Cronos in Feb 2024') are trimmable — anchor 4 ('efficient; minor instances of over-explanation that could be trimmed'), not 5 where every token earns its place.

4 / 5

Actionability

The 'ThreatProfile seed (plan/threat-profile.json)' JSON is copy-paste ready, the kill-chain table gives a specific executing agent → skill path per phase, and the CONOPS is framed to 'copy into conops.json' — however phases 9 (Exfiltration) and 10 (Impact) both map to 'post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md', a questionable routing gap, matching anchor 4 ('mostly executable guidance ... minor gaps') rather than 5.

4 / 5

Workflow Clarity

The 10-phase kill chain and 5-step CONOPS are clearly sequenced, and the destructive/batch operations carry explicit gates ('Defense Evasion (GATED)', 'Impact (CANARY)', the EMERGENCY abort criteria, SOC-agreed window, GPO rollback recorded in cleanup.json), so validation is not missing and the destructive-skill cap at 3 does not apply; but there are no feedback loops or verify-after-action checkpoints (e.g., confirm GPO rollback succeeded before closing), matching anchor 4 ('clear sequence with most checkpoints present; minor validation gaps') rather than 5.

4 / 5

Progressive Disclosure

No bundle files exist, and the ~90-line body is a clean overview: a kill-chain table pointing one level deep to per-phase skill files, clearly signaled shared references ('see the industry → actor map in ../../references/apt-groups.md'), and nothing inlined that belongs in a separate file — matching anchor 5 ('clear overview with well-signaled one-level-deep references; content appropriately split').

5 / 5

Total

17

/

20

Passed

Description

100%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Based on the skill's description, can an agent find and select it at the right time? Clear, specific descriptions lead to better discovery.

The description is exemplary: it enumerates the concrete kill-chain actions, declares scope honestly (canary/lab-only encryption, reusable template for other affiliates), and closes with an explicit, natural trigger list. Both 'what' and 'when' are answered concretely with no fluff or over-claims.

DimensionReasoningScore

Specificity

It lists six-plus concrete actions with sub-detail — 'broker/edge/RDP initial access, beacon, AD compromise to Domain Admin, defense evasion (Defender-disable via GPO, shadow-copy deletion), bulk exfil, then canary double-extortion encryption (Windows + ESXi)' — matching anchor 5 ('multiple specific concrete actions; comprehensive coverage'); anchor 4 would require a coverage gap, and none is evident.

5 / 5

Completeness

Both halves are explicit: the 'what' is the full double-extortion emulation playbook described concretely, and the 'when' is an explicit 'Triggers on:' clause with concrete phrases — matching anchor 5 ('clearly and explicitly answers both what AND when with concrete trigger phrases'); score 4 requires a weaker 'when', which this does not have.

5 / 5

Trigger Term Quality

'Triggers on: emulate LockBit, ransomware affiliate, RaaS, double extortion, StealBit, domain-wide ransomware, ESXi locker' plus actor names (ALPHV, Akira, Black Basta) gives comprehensive natural-term coverage including synonyms and actor-specific tooling — matching anchor 5, not 4 ('a few natural terms missing').

5 / 5

Distinctiveness Conflict Risk

It occupies a clear niche (RaaS-affiliate double-extortion emulation) with distinct triggers like 'StealBit', 'ESXi locker', and 'domain-wide ransomware' that no non-ransomware skill would naturally claim — matching anchor 5 ('clear niche with distinct triggers; minimal conflict risk'); the generic RaaS terms create only minimal overlap risk with hypothetical sibling ransomware playbooks.

5 / 5

Total

20

/

20

Passed

Validation

87%

Checks the skill against the spec for correct structure and formatting. All validation checks must pass before discovery and implementation can be scored.

Validation — 14 / 16 Passed

Validation for skill structure

CriteriaDescriptionResult

metadata_version

'metadata.version' is missing

Warning

metadata_field

'metadata' should map string keys to string values

Warning

Total

14

/

16

Passed

Repository

PurpleAILAB/Decepticon

Path

packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/soundwave/threat-profile/emulation/lockbit/SKILL.md

Reviewed

Table of Contents

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