mcp-setup
Configure popular MCP servers for enhanced agent capabilities
56
63%
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High
Do not use without reviewing
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tessl review fix ./skills/mcp-setup/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill asks the user for API keys/tokens and instructs the agent to embed them verbatim into CLI arguments, environment flags, or HTTP headers (e.g., -e EXA_API_KEY=<user-provided-key>, --header "Authorization: Bearer <token>"), which requires the LLM to handle/output secret values directly.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly configures MCP servers that let agents ingest public web content and user-generated data—e.g., "Exa Web Search" (web searches) and "Custom MCP Server" (arbitrary HTTP URLs) and GitHub integration—so the agent will read and act on untrusted third‑party content from those sources.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill configures and invokes runtime MCP endpoints/images that can control prompts or execute code — specifically the HTTP MCP URL https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/ (used in `claude mcp add --transport http ...`) and the Docker image ghcr.io/github/github-mcp-server (pulled and run via `docker run`), both of which are fetched/used at runtime and can return/execute remote code or prompt content.
- Repository
- Yeachan-Heo/oh-my-claudecode
- Commit
590fb98
- Audited
- Security analysis
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