Worktree-first dev environment manager for issues, PRs, and features with optional tmux sessions
53
61%
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Medium
Suggest reviewing before use
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tessl review fix ./skills/project-session-manager/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 medium severity finding. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill performs many filesystem and process-modifying actions in the user's home (cloning repos, creating worktrees/sessions, writing ~/.psm files) and explicitly instructs launching Claude with a "--dangerously-skip-permissions" flag that bypasses directory-trust/tool-approval prompts (a security bypass), though it does not request sudo, modify system files, or create system users.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Yes — the skill fetches untrusted, user-generated PR/issue content via provider calls (e.g., provider_github_fetch_pr / provider_* using gh, curl, az) and renders that content into .psm/review.md and .psm/fix.md which psm_launch_claude then instructs Claude to "Read <context file> for full task context, then begin," meaning third‑party content is read by the agent and can influence subsequent tool use (see SKILL.md and lib/tmux.sh / psm_launch_claude / psm_inject_prompt).
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill fetches external PR/issue content at runtime (e.g., via GitHub URLs such as https://github.com/owner/repo/pull/123 and repository clones like https://github.com/<repo>.git / gh pr view) and renders/injects that fetched content into Claude's task context, so remote content can directly control agent prompts.
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