project-session-manager
Worktree-first dev environment manager for issues, PRs, and features with optional tmux sessions
38
37%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
—
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/project-session-manager/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 3 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). Yes — the skill fetches untrusted, user-generated PR/issue content via provider calls (e.g., provider_github_fetch_pr / provider_* using gh, curl, az) and renders that content into .psm/review.md and .psm/fix.md which psm_launch_claude then instructs Claude to "Read <context file> for full task context, then begin," meaning third‑party content is read by the agent and can influence subsequent tool use (see SKILL.md and lib/tmux.sh / psm_launch_claude / psm_inject_prompt).
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill fetches external PR/issue content at runtime (e.g., via GitHub URLs such as https://github.com/owner/repo/pull/123 and repository clones like https://github.com/<repo>.git / gh pr view) and renders/injects that fetched content into Claude's task context, so remote content can directly control agent prompts.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (medium risk: 0.60). The skill performs many filesystem and process-modifying actions in the user's home (cloning repos, creating worktrees/sessions, writing ~/.psm files) and explicitly instructs launching Claude with a "--dangerously-skip-permissions" flag that bypasses directory-trust/tool-approval prompts (a security bypass), though it does not request sudo, modify system files, or create system users.
- Repository
- Yeachan-Heo/oh-my-claudecode
- Commit
679b418
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.