Mandatory code reviews via /code-review before commits and deploys
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill ingests untrusted, user-contributed code diffs and files and passes them directly to external LLM CLIs in its required workflows — e.g., the GitHub Actions (gemini-review.yml / codex-review.yml / dual/triple-review workflows) explicitly run git diff origin/${{ github.base_ref }}...HEAD and feed that diff to gemini/codex/claude, and the pre-commit hook invokes claude on staged files — meaning arbitrary third-party PR content is read and can influence the agents' decisions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill contains runtime steps that fetch and execute remote code — e.g., the GitHub Action reference uses: openai/codex-action@main, the npx invocation of @anthropic-ai/claude-code, and the Gemini extension install URL https://github.com/gemini-cli-extensions/code-review — all of which are pulled/installed at runtime and can execute remote code or control agent prompts/instructions.
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