Mandatory code reviews via /code-review before commits and deploys
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's CI/workflow and commands (e.g., GitHub Actions and Gemini/Codex invocations that run git diff origin/${{ github.base_ref }}...HEAD, /code-review --pr, and gemini -p "Review this pull request diff ... $(cat diff.txt)") explicitly ingest and pass pull request/diff content (potentially from external contributors/public forks) into LLMs for automated review and gating, so untrusted third-party user-generated content can influence the agent's decisions and actions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's CI/hooks explicitly fetch and run remote CLIs/actions at runtime—e.g., npx @anthropic-ai/claude-code, npm install -g @openai/codex and @google/gemini-cli (and the gemini extension fetched from https://github.com/gemini-cli-extensions/code-review and the GitHub Action repo openai/codex-action@main)—which will execute remote code and can control prompts/instructions, so these runtime-installed external packages/repos are high-risk dependencies.
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