Google Gemini CLI code review with Gemini 2.5 Pro, 1M token context, CI/CD integration
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2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The skill's CI/CD and GitHub workflows explicitly ingest and analyze user-generated repository/PR diffs (e.g., git diff > diff.txt and the GitHub Action / Gemini Code Assist app that runs gemini on pull request diffs), so untrusted third-party content from GitHub can be read and influence the agent's decisions/actions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill explicitly installs and runs external code at runtime—e.g., "gemini extensions install https://github.com/gemini-cli-extensions/code-review" and the GitHub Action reference "uses: google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli@v1"—both fetch and execute remote repository code that can modify agent prompts/behavior, so they present a runtime risk.
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