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ai-security

Use when assessing AI/ML systems for prompt injection, jailbreak vulnerabilities, model inversion risk, data poisoning exposure, or agent tool abuse. Covers MITRE ATLAS technique mapping, injection signature detection, and adversarial robustness scoring.

68

Quality

86%

Does it follow best practices?

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SecuritybySnyk

Passed

No findings from the security scan

SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Quality

Content

75%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.

A strong, highly actionable security-assessment skill: every workflow is backed by verified executable scanner commands, real bundle files, and exit-code-driven decision points. Its main weakness is token efficiency — it defines concepts Claude already knows and inlines reference-grade tables that belong alongside atlas-coverage.md — plus a merely implied fix-and-rescan loop in the workflows.

Suggestions

Cut the definitional opening sentences of each threat section ("Prompt injection occurs when...", "Model inversion attacks reconstruct training data...", "Data poisoning attacks insert malicious examples...") — Claude already knows these concepts; lead directly with the detection signatures and scoring guidance.

Move the full risk matrices (model inversion by access level, data poisoning by fine-tuning scope) and the guardrail pattern catalogs into references/ alongside atlas-coverage.md, keeping only the summary rows and pointers inline to reduce SKILL.md's footprint.

Make the remediation feedback loop explicit in Workflow 1: after "fix critical findings first", add a step to re-run the scanner and confirm exit code 0/1 before deployment is approved.

DimensionReasoningScore

Conciseness

Several sections open by defining concepts Claude already knows — "Prompt injection occurs when adversarial input overrides the model's system prompt", "Model inversion attacks reconstruct training data from model outputs", "Data poisoning attacks insert malicious examples into training data" — and the ~365-line body inlines reference-style material (full risk matrices, guardrail catalogs) that could be tightened or split out. This is mostly efficient but includes unnecessary explanation, matching anchor 3; it is not lean throughout (score 4) because the definition sentences and duplicated ATLAS tables both add avoidable tokens.

3 / 5

Actionability

The guidance is fully executable: copy-paste-ready scanner invocations with real flags (--target-type, --access-level, --scope, --authorized, --json, --list-patterns), a concrete test-file JSON format, and a runnable CI/CD gate snippet using jq on output fields (.overall_risk, .findings[].finding_type) that all verified present in scripts/ai_threat_scanner.py. This matches the top anchor — commands cover the common cases and are ready to run — rather than leaving minor gaps (score 4).

5 / 5

Workflow Clarity

Three clearly sequenced workflows with explicit decision checkpoints driven by exit codes ("Exit code 2 = block deployment; fix critical findings first") and a CI gate that validates the report and blocks on critical risk. The fix-and-rescan feedback loop after remediation is implied by the decision text but never shown as an explicit re-run/re-validate step, so this fits anchor 4 (most checkpoints present, minor validation gaps) rather than anchor 5 (explicit feedback loops for error recovery).

4 / 5

Progressive Disclosure

Structure is good: a table of contents, a clearly signaled one-level-deep reference ("Full ATLAS technique coverage reference: references/atlas-coverage.md", verified to exist and substantive), and a real scripts/ entry point, matching the actual bundle layout. Substantial reference-style content — the model-inversion and data-poisoning risk matrices and the guardrail pattern catalogs — is inlined in SKILL.md rather than split into references, which fits anchor 4 (good structure, minor organization gaps) rather than anchor 5 (content appropriately split into an overview-plus-references shape).

4 / 5

Total

16

/

20

Passed

Description

92%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Based on the skill's description, can an agent find and select it at the right time? Clear, specific descriptions lead to better discovery.

A strong description: it opens with an explicit "Use when..." trigger clause naming concrete threat conditions, then states the skill's specific capabilities, all in third person with distinct AI-security vocabulary. The only minor gap is a few natural synonyms (LLM security, AI red teaming) that would widen trigger coverage.

DimensionReasoningScore

Specificity

The description enumerates concrete, specific actions — "MITRE ATLAS technique mapping, injection signature detection, and adversarial robustness scoring" — across a comprehensive list of threat types ("prompt injection, jailbreak vulnerabilities, model inversion risk, data poisoning exposure, or agent tool abuse"). It lists multiple specific concrete actions with comprehensive coverage, matching the top anchor; it is not merely naming a domain with generic actions (score 3) nor leaving minor gaps (score 4).

5 / 5

Completeness

Both halves are explicit: the trigger clause "Use when assessing AI/ML systems for prompt injection, jailbreak vulnerabilities, ..." answers when with concrete trigger conditions, and "Covers MITRE ATLAS technique mapping, injection signature detection, and adversarial robustness scoring" answers what. This clearly matches the anchor where both what and when are answered with concrete trigger phrases; the score-4 anchor ("when could be more explicit or specific") does not fit since the when clause is specific.

5 / 5

Trigger Term Quality

Natural terms a security reviewer would actually say are present — "prompt injection", "jailbreak", "model inversion", "data poisoning", "agent tool abuse", "MITRE ATLAS" — giving good keyword coverage. A few common variations are missing (e.g., "LLM security", "AI red teaming", "adversarial robustness testing"), so it falls just below the comprehensive-with-synonyms top anchor rather than clearly matching it.

4 / 5

Distinctiveness Conflict Risk

The description carves out a clear niche — security assessment of AI/ML systems and LLM agents specifically — with distinct triggers (prompt injection, jailbreak, ATLAS mapping) that would not naturally fire a general application-security or threat-hunting skill. Minimal conflict risk, matching the top anchor; score 4 ("minor overlap risk with closely related skills") is too cautious given the domain-specific vocabulary.

5 / 5

Total

19

/

20

Passed

Validation

93%

Checks the skill against the spec for correct structure and formatting. All validation checks must pass before discovery and implementation can be scored.

Validation — 15 / 16 Passed

Validation for skill structure

CriteriaDescriptionResult

relative_links

Relative link issues: 4 suspicious

Warning

Total

15

/

16

Passed

Repository

alirezarezvani/claude-skills

Path

engineering-team/skills/ai-security/SKILL.md

Reviewed

Table of Contents

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