tavily-best-practices
Build production-ready Tavily integrations with best practices for web search, content extraction, crawling, and research in agentic workflows, RAG systems, and autonomous agents
69
63%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./content/tavily/skills/tavily-best-practices/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly calls and ingests content from arbitrary public web sources via search/extract/crawl/map/research (see SKILL.md quick reference and references/crawl.md, references/extract.md, references/research.md) and shows agent workflows that read those results and synthesize actions/summaries, so untrusted third‑party content can materially influence tool decisions.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The Google ADK integration explicitly configures an MCPToolset with url="https://mcp.tavily.com/mcp/", which is contacted at runtime to provide tool responses and drive agent behavior (i.e., remote tool execution that can influence prompts/instructions), so this runtime endpoint is a risky external dependency.
- Repository
- andrewyng/context-hub
- Commit
eeb895b
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.