Code review checklist - coordinates specialist reviewers for thorough analysis
54
42%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Risky
Do not use without reviewing
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./dot_config/opencode/skill/review-checklist/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 1 high severity, 2 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt explicitly requires including the "full diff" and "full contents of every modified file" in payloads and dispatched tasks, so any API keys/passwords present in those files would be reproduced verbatim in LLM outputs to sub-agents, creating a high exfiltration risk.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The SKILL.md explicitly instructs fetching and ingesting user-generated content from public sources (e.g., GitHub PR bodies and inline comments via `gh pr view` and `gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/<PR_NUMBER>/comments`, and external Linear issues via the `linear` skill / `gq`), and those texts are incorporated into payloads and used to drive sub-agents, so untrusted third-party content can materially influence agent actions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill instructs the agent at runtime to fetch and inject external issue and PR content into model prompts (e.g., via the GitHub API endpoint https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{PR_NUMBER}/comments and gh/gh pr view calls), which directly controls prompts and is relied on as required context, so this is a runtime dependency that can influence agent behavior.
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