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threat-modeling

Run a structured threat-modeling session for a new feature, system, or architecture — STRIDE, attack trees, data flow diagrams, abuse cases. Use when the user mentions 'threat model,' 'threat modeling,' 'STRIDE,' 'attack tree,' 'abuse case,' 'data flow diagram,' 'DFD,' 'security architecture review,' 'security review,' 'design review,' 'pre-implementation security,' 'shift left,' 'what could go wrong,' or needs strategic security thinking before code is written.

70

Quality

88%

Does it follow best practices?

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SecuritybySnyk

Passed

No findings from the security scan

SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Quality

Content

81%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.

A high-quality methodology skill: a clear four-step workflow with built-in validation, copy-paste templates (Mermaid DFD, STRIDE tables, output document), and concrete good/bad mitigation contrasts. The main inefficiency is re-teaching standard STRIDE categories and DFD notation that Claude already knows; everything else earns its tokens.

Suggestions

Compress or drop the STRIDE definition table and the DFD-notation glossary (Claude already knows spoofing/tampering and rectangle/circle conventions); keep only the per-element worksheet format and the judgment guidance.

If the bundle grows, move the external references list and the output document template into a references/ file and keep SKILL.md as a lean overview.

DimensionReasoningScore

Conciseness

Mostly efficient, judgment-dense prose (bad-vs-good mitigation table, 'if you can't write the test, you don't have the mitigation, you have an intention', the trust-boundary test for when to skip), but the STRIDE category table and the DFD-notation list ('External entities (rectangles)... Processes (circles)...') re-explain standard security concepts Claude already knows. Not 4 because two full sections are padding Claude doesn't need; not 2 because the majority of the body adds non-obvious judgment and templates.

3 / 5

Actionability

Fully actionable instruction-only guidance: an executable Mermaid DFD example, a worked STRIDE-per-element table template, the abuse-case sentence format with three worked examples, a bad-vs-good mitigation comparison with concrete specifics (5 req/min per user IP with Redis-backed counter; KMS envelope encryption with 90-day rotation), and a copy-paste output document template. These cover the common cases end-to-end.

5 / 5

Workflow Clarity

The body is organized as Shostack's four questions with Steps 1-4 in strict sequence, and Step 4 is itself a validation checkpoint: coverage check ('every element... every threat... every mitigation has an owner and a deadline'), adversarial second pass to break blind spots, and trace-to-tests. Explicit validation steps and error-recovery guidance ('if you can't write the test...') match the top anchor.

5 / 5

Progressive Disclosure

No bundle files exist (references/, scripts/, assets/ are absent), and the single 210-line body is well-sectioned with clear headers, no buried or nested references, and an external-reading list cleanly isolated at the end. Good structure and appropriately self-contained; not 5 because the length exceeds what the simple-skill exception rewards and a couple of sections (STRIDE reference table, external references) are natural candidates for split-out files if the bundle grows.

4 / 5

Total

17

/

20

Passed

Description

91%Weight 40%Scale 1-5

Based on the skill's description, can an agent find and select it at the right time? Clear, specific descriptions lead to better discovery.

A strong description: explicit what and when, third-person voice, and an unusually rich set of natural trigger terms including synonyms and a colloquial phrase. The only weaknesses are broad triggers ('security review,' 'design review') that create minor conflict risk with audit-style skills, and capability coverage that stops at naming frameworks.

Suggestions

Narrow or qualify the broad triggers 'security review' and 'design review' (e.g., 'design-time security review (not code audit)') to reduce overlap with audit skills.

Add one concrete output artifact to the what clause (e.g., 'produces a STRIDE-per-element threat table and a prioritized mitigation plan') to lift specificity from framework names to deliverables.

DimensionReasoningScore

Specificity

"Run a structured threat-modeling session for a new feature, system, or architecture — STRIDE, attack trees, data flow diagrams, abuse cases" names the domain and several concrete artifacts (STRIDE analysis, attack trees, DFDs, abuse cases), with only minor gaps in coverage (e.g., risk-mitigation output format is implied rather than named). Not 5 because the actions are framework names rather than a fully enumerated list of what the skill produces; not 3 because coverage clearly exceeds 1-2 actions.

4 / 5

Completeness

It explicitly answers both questions: the what ("Run a structured threat-modeling session... STRIDE, attack trees, data flow diagrams, abuse cases") and the when ("Use when the user mentions 'threat model,'... or needs strategic security thinking before code is written") with concrete trigger phrases, matching the anchor-5 example structure.

5 / 5

Trigger Term Quality

The trigger list is comprehensive and natural: 'threat model,' 'threat modeling,' 'STRIDE,' 'attack tree,' 'abuse case,' 'data flow diagram,' 'DFD,' 'security architecture review,' 'security review,' 'design review,' 'pre-implementation security,' 'shift left,' 'what could go wrong' — covering synonyms, an acronym, and a colloquial phrasing a user would actually say.

5 / 5

Distinctiveness Conflict Risk

The design-time framing ('before code is written,' 'pre-implementation security') carves a clear niche distinct from code-audit skills, but generic triggers like 'security review' and 'design review' carry minor overlap risk with audit/review skills. Not 5 because those broad phrases could plausibly fire for a different security skill; not 3 because the specialized trigger terms dominate.

4 / 5

Total

18

/

20

Passed

Validation

93%

Checks the skill against the spec for correct structure and formatting. All validation checks must pass before discovery and implementation can be scored.

Validation — 15 / 16 Passed

Validation for skill structure

CriteriaDescriptionResult

allowed_tools_field

'allowed-tools' contains unusual tool name(s)

Warning

Total

15

/

16

Passed

Repository
briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills
Reviewed

Table of Contents

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