Content
75%Weight 40%Scale 1-5Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.
A well-crafted policy skill: executable copy-paste broker commands, a clear primary/fallback mechanism decision with a discouraged-path rationale, hard Never-Do rules, and a real, properly referenced implementation script. It falls just short of top marks due to repeated restatement of the core invariant, an advisory-only MCP section, and the absence of any explicit verification or failure-handling step for broker outcomes.
Suggestions
Consolidate the repeated 'the secret never enters your context' statements (currently ~6 phrasings across Core Principle, mechanisms, and Reference Implementation) into one authoritative statement plus the Never-Do list.
Add one concrete MCP example (e.g., a snippet of server config using ${input:...} or env indirection with a named credential) so the MCP authentication path is as executable as the API path.
Add a short verification step for broker outcomes — e.g., what to do when the broker reports a missing keyring entry or a failed request, mirroring the existing 'no keyring entry exists' recovery guidance.
| Dimension | Reasoning | Score |
|---|---|---|
Conciseness | The body is imperative and free of concepts Claude already knows, but the core invariant is restated roughly six times ('You never possess a secret value', 'never enters the model's context window', 'You never see the value', 'exists only inside the broker process', 'never written to stdout/stderr, never logged, never returned'). Minor over-explanation that could be trimmed fits anchor 4 rather than 5. | 4 / 5 |
Actionability | Both mechanisms get copy-paste-ready commands ('python3 scripts/keyring_broker.py request --name github_token --url ... --header "Authorization: Bearer {secret}"' and the exec example), but the MCP-server subsection is advisory only ('Prefer OAuth flows', 'Use ${input:...}/env indirection') with no executable example despite MCP being a stated use case. Mostly executable with minor gaps fits anchor 4. | 4 / 5 |
Workflow Clarity | The primary-vs-fallback decision is clearly sequenced with rationale for each, and an error-recovery path exists ('If a secret is unavoidable and no keyring entry exists, ask the user to run keyring set ...'). Not a destructive/batch skill, so no cap applies; but there is no explicit verification step (e.g., how to confirm output was scrubbed or handle broker failure), fitting anchor 4 rather than 5. | 4 / 5 |
Progressive Disclosure | Verified against the actual bundle: scripts/keyring_broker.py exists, is correctly pathed, is used in both examples, and is explicitly signaled in the Reference Implementation section, with implementation appropriately split out of the policy body. Minor gap: the broker's full CLI surface and MCP-config patterns are only inline in the ~100-line body with no separate reference doc, fitting anchor 4 rather than 5. | 4 / 5 |
Total | 16 / 20 Passed |