cursor-sdk
Guide users building apps, scripts, CI pipelines, or automations on top of the Cursor TypeScript SDK (`@cursor/sdk`). Use this skill whenever the user mentions integrating, installing, or writing code against the Cursor SDK; whenever they say `Agent.create`, `Agent.prompt`, `Agent.resume`, `agent.send`, `run.stream`, `CursorAgentError`, or `@cursor/sdk`; whenever they ask to run Cursor agents programmatically from a script, CI/CD pipeline, GitHub Action, backend service, or any other code that isn't the Cursor IDE itself; and whenever they want to pick between local and cloud runtime, configure MCP servers for an SDK agent, or handle streaming, cancellation, or errors from an SDK agent. Also trigger when a user is wiring Cursor into an automation, writing a bot that runs Cursor, or porting REST `/v1/agents` calls to the SDK, even if they don't explicitly name the package. Use this eagerly rather than answering from memory; the SDK surface evolves and this skill plus its references are the source of truth for the external package.
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). Yes — the skill explicitly instructs the SDK to clone and run against arbitrary GitHub repo URLs via cloud.repos (SKILL.md and references/runtime-choice.md) and to call external MCP HTTP servers (references/mcp.md), both of which are untrusted/user-provided third‑party content that the agent reads and acts on (e.g., triage, code review, opening PRs), enabling indirect prompt injection.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill examples show runtime-executed external dependencies: stdio MCP servers launched via npx (e.g., @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem, @modelcontextprotocol/server-github) and cloud/local MCP HTTP endpoints (e.g., https://mcp.linear.app/sse, https://mcp.example.com/postgres, https://example.com/mcp) plus GitHub repo URLs cloned at cloud runtime (e.g., https://github.com/your-org/your-repo), all of which are fetched or started during agent runtime and can execute remote code or inject context that directly controls agent behavior.
- Repository
- cursor/plugins
- Commit
7dd9fea
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.