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hunt-credential-access

Hunt for credential access techniques like LSASS dumping or browser credential theft. Use when searching for evidence of credential harvesting. Takes MITRE technique IDs and searches for behavioral indicators in SIEM.

Install with Tessl CLI

npx tessl i github:dandye/ai-runbooks --skill hunt-credential-access
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Credential Access TTP Hunt Skill

Proactively hunt for MITRE ATT&CK Credential Access techniques (T1003, T1555, etc.) based on threat intelligence or hypothesis.

Inputs

  • TECHNIQUE_IDS - Comma-separated MITRE technique IDs (e.g., "T1003.001,T1555.003")
  • TIME_FRAME_HOURS - Lookback period (default: 72)
  • (Optional) TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY - UDM query to narrow scope
  • (Optional) HUNT_HYPOTHESIS - Reason for the hunt
  • (Optional) HUNT_CASE_ID - SOAR case for tracking

Common Techniques

TechniqueDescription
T1003.001LSASS Memory
T1003.002Security Account Manager
T1003.003NTDS
T1003.004LSA Secrets
T1003.005Cached Domain Credentials
T1003.006DCSync
T1555.001Keychain
T1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers
T1555.004Windows Credential Manager

Workflow

Step 1: Research Techniques

For each technique in TECHNIQUE_IDS:

gti-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="Explain MITRE ATT&CK technique T1003.001")

Understand:

  • What the technique does
  • Common procedures/tools
  • Detection methods

Step 2: Develop Hunt Queries

T1003.001 - LSASS Memory Access:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
target.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe"

Look for suspicious parent processes accessing lsass.exe.

T1003.001 - Known Dumping Tools:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
(principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "mimikatz" OR
 principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "procdump" OR
 principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "sekurlsa")

T1555.003 - Browser Credential Files:

metadata.event_type = "FILE_OPEN" AND
(target.file.full_path CONTAINS "Login Data" OR
 target.file.full_path CONTAINS "Web Data" OR
 target.file.full_path CONTAINS "cookies.sqlite") AND
principal.process.file.full_path NOT IN ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe")

T1003.006 - DCSync:

metadata.event_type = "DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_REPLICATION" AND
principal.hostname NOT IN @known_domain_controllers

General - Credential Dumping Tools:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
(target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "mimikatz" OR
 target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "lazagne" OR
 target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "pypykatz")

Combine with TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY if provided.

Step 3: Execute Searches

secops-mcp.search_security_events(text=query, hours_back=TIME_FRAME_HOURS)

Step 4: Analyze Results

Look for:

  • Low-prevalence events (unusual parent-child relationships)
  • Access from unexpected applications
  • Correlation with other suspicious activity
  • Known bad tool signatures

Step 5: Enrich Findings

If suspicious events found:

secops-mcp.lookup_entity(entity_value=USER_OR_HOST)

For file hashes:

gti-mcp.get_file_report(hash=HASH)

Step 6: Document Hunt

Use /document-in-case:

  • Techniques hunted with descriptions
  • Queries used
  • Findings (positive AND negative)
  • Enrichment results
  • Risk assessment

Step 7: Escalate or Conclude

Credential theft confirmed: → Trigger /respond-compromised-account for affected users → Escalate to incident response → Consider password resets for exposed credentials

No findings: → Document negative results → Confirm detection coverage for these techniques

Required Outputs

After completing this skill, you MUST report these outputs:

OutputDescription
FINDINGSDetected credential access activity (events, processes, files accessed)
DETECTED_TECHNIQUESMITRE techniques observed (e.g., T1003.001, T1555.003)
AFFECTED_ACCOUNTSAccounts potentially compromised (users whose credentials may be exposed)

Detection Gaps to Note

If queries return no results, consider:

  • Is the required telemetry being collected?
  • Are endpoint logs being forwarded to SIEM?
  • Do detection rules exist for these techniques?

Document gaps for security engineering follow-up.

Repository
dandye/ai-runbooks
Last updated
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