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respond-compromised-account

Respond to a potentially compromised user account. Use when impossible travel, credential stuffing, successful phishing, or suspicious activity indicates account compromise. Investigates activity, contains the account, removes persistence, and restores access.

Install with Tessl CLI

npx tessl i github:dandye/ai-runbooks --skill respond-compromised-account
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SKILL.md
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Compromised User Account Response Skill

Structured workflow for responding to potentially compromised user accounts using the PICERL model.

Inputs

  • USER_ID - Username or email of the potentially compromised user
  • CASE_ID - SOAR case ID for documentation
  • ALERT_GROUP_IDENTIFIERS - Alert group identifiers from SOAR
  • (Optional) INITIAL_ALERT_DETAILS - Summary of triggering alert

Required Outputs

After completing each phase, you MUST report these outputs:

Identification Phase

OutputDescription
AFFECTED_ACCOUNTSUser accounts confirmed or suspected compromised
SUSPICIOUS_ACTIVITYSummary of anomalous activity detected
ACCESS_SCOPESystems/data the account had access to
COMPROMISE_LIKELIHOODAssessment level: Low, Medium, High, Confirmed

Containment Phase

OutputDescription
DISABLED_ACCOUNTSAccounts that were disabled
RESET_PASSWORDSAccounts with passwords reset
REVOKED_SESSIONSSessions terminated

Eradication Phase

OutputDescription
REMOVED_PERSISTENCEPersistence mechanisms removed (forwarding rules, OAuth apps, etc.)
CLEANED_ENDPOINTSAssociated endpoints verified clean

Recovery Phase

OutputDescription
RESTORED_ACCOUNTSAccounts re-enabled with new security controls
USER_NOTIFICATIONSUsers notified of incident and required actions

PICERL Phases

Phase 2: Identification

Step 2.1: Get Context

secops-soar.get_case_full_details(case_id=CASE_ID)

Use /check-duplicates.

Step 2.2: Gather Initial Context

SIEM entity lookup:

secops-mcp.lookup_entity(entity_value=USER_ID)

(If IDP tools available):

  • Account status
  • Recent logins
  • MFA configuration
  • Password last changed

Step 2.3: Analyze User Activity

Search SIEM for last 96 hours:

secops-mcp.search_security_events(
    text="All activity for USER_ID",
    hours_back=96
)

Look for:

  • Anomalous logins: Unusual locations, times, IPs, user agents
  • Suspicious commands: On associated endpoints
  • Sensitive access: Files, applications, databases
  • Lateral movement: Logins to other systems
  • Data exfiltration: Large transfers, unusual destinations
  • Account changes: MFA, recovery email, forwarding rules
  • OAuth grants: New application authorizations

Step 2.4: Check Related Cases

Use /find-relevant-case with [USER_ID].

Step 2.5: Assess Compromise Likelihood

LevelIndicators
LowSingle anomalous event, user confirms legitimate
MediumMultiple anomalies, unverified
HighClear malicious activity patterns
ConfirmedKnown credential theft, attacker actions visible

Document: COMPROMISE_LIKELIHOOD

Step 2.6: Document Identification

Use /document-in-case with findings and assessment.


Phase 3: Containment

Step 3.1: Confirm Containment Actions

Based on COMPROMISE_LIKELIHOOD, use /confirm-action:

High/Confirmed:

"Disable account [USER_ID] immediately?"

Medium:

"Reset password and terminate sessions for [USER_ID]?"

Low:

"Force MFA re-enrollment for [USER_ID]?"

Step 3.2: Execute Containment

(Requires Identity Provider tools)

Actions by severity:

  • Disable account: Immediate lockout
  • Reset password: Force change on next login
  • Terminate sessions: Invalidate all active sessions
  • Revoke tokens: OAuth and API tokens

Step 3.3: Verify Containment

Monitor for continued activity:

secops-mcp.search_security_events(
    text="Activity from USER_ID after containment",
    hours_back=1
)

Use /document-in-case with containment status.


Phase 4: Eradication

Step 4.1: Investigate Attacker Actions

Thoroughly review what the attacker did while in the account:

secops-mcp.search_security_events(
    text="All actions by USER_ID during compromise window",
    hours_back=96
)

Focus on:

  • Emails: Sent, received, forwarding rules created
  • Data access: Files downloaded, shared externally
  • Configuration: Account settings changed
  • OAuth apps: New authorizations
  • Lateral movement: Other systems accessed

Step 4.2: Check for Persistence

(Requires email/cloud platform tools)

Look for:

  • Email forwarding rules to external addresses
  • Delegate access grants
  • Malicious OAuth applications
  • Inbox rules that hide attacker activity
  • Recovery email/phone changes

Step 4.3: Remove Persistence

Delete/revoke all identified persistence:

  • Remove forwarding rules
  • Revoke OAuth apps
  • Remove delegate access
  • Reset recovery options

Step 4.4: Endpoint Investigation

If account accessed specific endpoints:

Trigger endpoint triage to check for:

  • Malware dropped
  • Persistence mechanisms
  • Credential caching

Use /document-in-case with eradication findings.


Phase 5: Recovery

Step 5.1: Ensure Threat Removed

Verify:

  • All persistence removed
  • Associated endpoints clean
  • No ongoing attacker access

Step 5.2: Secure Account

  • Strong password set
  • MFA properly configured (hardware key preferred)
  • Recovery options secured
  • Review account permissions

Step 5.3: Re-enable Account

(If disabled during containment)

Re-enable with:

  • Password change required on first login
  • MFA verification required

Step 5.4: Communicate with User

Inform the user:

  • What happened (appropriate level of detail)
  • Actions taken on their account
  • Steps they need to take
  • Warning signs to watch for
  • How to report suspicious activity

Step 5.5: Monitor Account

Enhanced monitoring for 30 days:

  • Watch for anomalous activity
  • Alert on unusual logins
  • Track sensitive data access

Use /document-in-case with recovery status.


Phase 6: Lessons Learned

Use /generate-report with:

  • Initial access vector (if determined)
  • Attacker actions during compromise
  • Data potentially exposed
  • Response timeline
  • Recommendations

Review:

  • How was compromise detected?
  • Was MFA bypassed? How?
  • What data was at risk?
  • What detections should be added/tuned?

Critical Warnings

  • DO NOT execute containment without analyst confirmation
  • DO NOT re-enable without checking for persistence
  • MUST document all findings in SOAR
  • ALWAYS check for forwarding rules and OAuth apps

Containment Decision Matrix

LikelihoodDisable AccountReset PasswordTerminate Sessions
Confirmed✅ Immediate
High✅ Recommended
MediumConsider
LowNoConsiderConsider

Common Persistence Mechanisms

MechanismWhere to Check
Email forwardingMail rules
Delegate accessMailbox permissions
OAuth appsConnected applications
Inbox rulesMail filters
Recovery optionsAccount settings
API tokensDeveloper settings
Repository
dandye/ai-runbooks
Last updated
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