coding-agent
Run Codex CLI, Claude Code, OpenCode, or Pi Coding Agent via background process for programmatic control.
65
58%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/coding-agent/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 3 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). SKILL.md explicitly instructs cloning and fetching public GitHub repositories (e.g., "git clone https://github.com/user/repo.git $REVIEW_DIR" and "git fetch origin '+refs/pull/*/head:...') and then running coding agents (Codex/claude/pi) in those workdirs, so the agent will read and act on untrusted, user-generated repo/PR content that could embed instructions influencing tool behavior.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly runs git clone at runtime (git clone https://github.com/user/repo.git $REVIEW_DIR) and then invokes codex review/git-diff on that checked-out content, so remote repository data is fetched during runtime and injected into the agent's context, directly influencing its prompts and actions.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (medium risk: 0.60). The prompt explicitly encourages running coding agents with flags that bypass sandboxing/approvals (e.g. --yolo) and exposes an "elevated" host mode while showing examples of running arbitrary shell commands (including global npm installs and background processes), which enables the agent to modify the host state even though it does not directly instruct creating users, editing system-level configs, or invoking sudo; this is a moderate-to-high risk of compromising the machine.
- Repository
- deepgram/dglabs-deepclaw
- Commit
ec8d4f8
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.