tunnel-doctor
Diagnoses and fixes conflicts between Tailscale and proxy/VPN tools (Shadowrocket, Clash, Surge) on macOS. Covers five conflict layers - (1) route hijacking, (2) HTTP proxy env var interception, (3) system proxy bypass, (4) SSH ProxyCommand double tunneling, and (5) VM/container runtime proxy propagation (OrbStack/Docker). Includes SOP for remote development via SSH tunnels with proxy-safe Makefile patterns. Use when Tailscale ping works but SSH/HTTP times out, when browser returns 503 but curl works, when git push fails with "failed to begin relaying via HTTP", when Docker pull times out behind TUN/VPN, when setting up Tailscale SSH to WSL instances, or when bootstrapping remote dev environments over Tailscale.
92
92%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.70). The SKILL.md diagnostic workflow explicitly instructs running network queries that fetch and interpret responses from public/untrusted services (e.g., curl/dig/ssh-keyscan/docker pull against Docker Hub/GitHub/public DNS and even a Shadowrocket LAN API) and uses those outputs to decide fixes, so untrusted third‑party content can materially influence subsequent actions.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt instructs the agent/operator to modify system and user configuration files (e.g. ~/.ssh/config, ~/.zshrc, ~/.orbstack/config/docker.json), run privileged commands (sudo snap remove, sudo tailscale up), and change runtime/daemon state (install/remove services), which directly alters the machine's state and can bypass protections—so it must be flagged.
- Repository
- fernandezbaptiste/claude-code-skills
- Commit
4f0eae8
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.