Land and deploy workflow. (gstack)
Security
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.
The skill instructs the agent to embed a non-visible marker ("<gstack-qid:{...}>") into AskUserQuestion text so hooks can auto-decide, which is a hidden/deceptive instruction that alters behavior invisibly and is outside the user-facing merge/deploy purpose.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
In the /land-and-deploy runtime, the workflow reads outsider-authored PR free text directly from GitHub via `gh pr view ...` (Step 1: title/body/metadata; Step 3.5c: `gh pr view --json body -q .body`), then uses that text during readiness reporting and to drive confirmation/merge decisions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill downloads and executes a remote install script at runtime via curl "https://bun.sh/install" and then runs it with bash, which fetches and executes remote code (https://bun.sh/install).
d078622
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