cloudflare-workers-ai
Run LLMs and AI models on Cloudflare's GPU network with Workers AI. Includes Llama 4, Gemma 3, Mistral 3.1, Flux images, BGE embeddings, streaming, and AI Gateway. Handles 2025 breaking changes. Prevents 7 documented errors. Use when: implementing LLM inference, images, RAG, or troubleshooting AI_ERROR, rate limits, max_tokens, BGE pooling, context window, neuron billing, Miniflare AI binding, NSFW filter, num_steps.
86
88%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill fetches and ingests arbitrary external content that is then used as prompt/context for models — e.g., templates/ai-vision-models.ts's /vision/url endpoint directly fetches user-supplied URLs and the SKILL.md/templates' RAG examples use env.VECTORIZE matches (m.metadata.text) as context passed into env.AI.run, which can let untrusted third‑party content influence model behavior.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The /vision/url endpoint in templates/ai-vision-models.ts performs a runtime fetch of a user-supplied URL via fetch(url) and converts the retrieved image into base64 which is then injected into env.AI.run messages, meaning untrusted remote content (the fetched URL) directly controls the model input/context.
- Repository
- jezweb/claude-skills
- Commit
fa91c34
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
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