discovery
Capture interesting finds to the Vault via Inngest. Triggers when the user shares a URL, repo, or idea with signal words like "interesting", "cool", "neat", "check this out", "look at this", "came across", or when sharing content with minimal context that implies it should be remembered. Also triggers on bare URL drops with no explicit ask. Fires a discovery/noted event and continues the conversation — the pipeline handles everything else.
81
77%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/discovery/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's enrichment pipeline (SKILL.md: "Investigate — clone repos, extract articles via defuddle, read content" and "Deep dig... Fetch content — X API for tweets, defuddle for articles, repo clone for repos", plus YouTube embedding) clearly ingests public, user-generated URLs and uses that content to generate summaries, recommend monitoring, and drive publish/subscription actions, so untrusted third-party content can materially influence behavior.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly fetches arbitrary user-shared URLs at runtime (including repo clones and social posts — e.g., git@github.com:org/repo.git and x.com/*/status/*) and then feeds that fetched content into the enrichment/analysis pipeline (cloning repos and passing content to the "pi" analyzer), so remote content can directly control the agent's prompts/outputs.
- Repository
- joelhooks/joelclaw
- Commit
825972c
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.