k8s
Operate the joelclaw Kubernetes cluster — Talos Linux on Colima (Mac Mini). Deploy services, check health, debug pods, recover from restarts, add ports, manage Helm releases, inspect logs, fix networking. Triggers on: 'kubectl', 'pods', 'deploy to k8s', 'cluster health', 'restart pod', 'helm install', 'talosctl', 'colima', 'nodeport', 'flannel', 'port mapping', 'k8s down', 'cluster not working', 'add a port', 'PVC', 'storage', any k8s/Talos/Colima infrastructure task. Also triggers on service-specific deploy: 'deploy redis', 'redeploy inngest', 'livekit helm', 'pds not responding'.
69
85%
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Medium
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
1 medium severity finding. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
The skill contains many host-level administrative actions (e.g., "sudo modprobe br_netfilter", editing /Library/LaunchDaemons plists, updating Docker host configs, changing Colima VM settings and kube/talos endpoints) that require elevated privileges and modify system state, so it instructs actions that can compromise the machine.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The required runtime workflow for the k8s agent runner creates Kubernetes Jobs whose pods materialize a repo from `REPO_URL`/`REPO_BRANCH` and then execute the agent; if `REPO_URL` points to outsider-authored content (e.g., arbitrary public repo/URL), that repo’s files become readable text in the pod’s `/workspace` and thus enter the LLM context via the agent’s execution.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The Agent Runner runtime explicitly materializes arbitrary repos from the supplied REPO_URL (git clone at job runtime) and pulls/executes the runtime image ghcr.io/joelhooks/agent-runner:latest, so remote repository content and container images are fetched at runtime and can directly control prompts or execute code.
- Repository
- joelhooks/joelclaw
- Commit
d952451
- Audited
- Security analysis
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