plugin-installer
Install validated Codex plugins from trusted sources with quarantine validation, provenance, and rollback. Use when distribution and installation are the primary goals.
44
44%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
—
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./Plugins/plugin-factory/fixtures/budget-archive/2026-04-21/deferred-store/skills/infrastructure_ops/plugin-installer/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill explicitly fetches and ingests user-generated content from public GitHub (see SKILL.md allowlist of https://github.com, https://api.github.com, https://raw.githubusercontent.com and scripts/github_utils.py’s github_request/github_api_contents_url), and that content is read as part of quarantine/validation and install decisions, so untrusted third-party data could indirectly influence agent actions.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (low risk: 0.30). The skill explicitly performs installs and can write to a destination root (i.e., mutate the machine), but it includes provenance/quarantine safeguards, restricts network hosts, and does not request sudo, privilege escalation, or creation of users—so it is potentially state-changing but not actively instructing compromise.
- Repository
- jscraik/Agent-Skills
- Commit
4c78f98
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.