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readme-doctor

Audit a GitHub repo's README against best-practice patterns and produce a prioritized punch list of fixes. Runs a structured review covering hero presence, install-to-first-success length, "what is this in one sentence" clarity, audience-jargon match, scannability, and drift signals (stale versions, dead links, badge sprawl). Read-only diagnostic; opens a PR only when the user explicitly asks.

72

Quality

65%

Does it follow best practices?

Impact

Pending

No eval scenarios have been run

SecuritybySnyk

Advisory

Suggest reviewing before use

Optimize this skill with Tessl

npx tessl skill review --optimize ./plugins/repo-doctor/skills/readme-doctor/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.

Medium

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly accepts a GitHub URL and performs `gh repo view` + shallow clone and scans README text, recent commits, file tree, and GitHub signals (see SKILL.md §1.2–1.3), meaning it ingests arbitrary public GitHub repos (user-generated/untrusted content) and uses that content to drive classification, scoring, and potential edits — enabling indirect prompt injection.

Report incorrect finding
Medium

W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)

What this means

The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.

Why it was flagged

Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly fetches a user-supplied GitHub repository URL at runtime (e.g., https://github.com/owner/repo or git@github.com:owner/repo.git via `gh repo view` + clone) and injects the README/manifest/file-tree content into the audit prompts, so external repo content directly controls the model's inputs.

Repository
livlign/claude-skills
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

Is this your skill?

If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.