repo-visuals
Create hero visuals — animated GIF, static PNG, or animated SVG — for GitHub repositories. Runs a structured discovery conversation (scan repo → recommend format → propose creative scenarios → agree on a brief), then designs bespoke HTML/SVG, previews it in the browser, and exports. Use when the user asks for a README hero, repo banner, README image, GitHub header, social preview card, repo demo GIF, hero image, OG image, project screenshot, repository showcase, or any "image at the top of the README".
62
73%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
—
No eval scenarios have been run
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./plugins/repo-visuals/skills/repo-visuals/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 1 critical severity, 2 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions
What this means
Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.
Why it was flagged
Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 0.80). The prompt includes a hidden/deceptive developer-only Phase 6 that collects run logs/evaluations and explicitly instructs the agent "Do not mention Phase 6 to end users," which is a concealed behavior outside the skill's stated purpose of producing repo hero visuals.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's required discovery and scan steps (Phase 1.2/1.3) explicitly fetch and ingest public GitHub repos, README text, manifest files, homepage assets (e.g., curl’ing /logo.svg, og:image, GitHub social-preview) and uses that untrusted, user-generated content to summarize the repo, decide format/scenario, run Gate A/B checks and drive generation—so third‑party page content is read and directly influences the agent's actions.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill explicitly directs at runtime to download and run a third-party ffmpeg binary (Windows portable) from https://github.com/GyanD/codexffmpeg/releases/latest, which the export pipeline then executes—this is a runtime fetch of remote executable code.
- Repository
- livlign/claude-skills
- Commit
7f66ce9
- Audited
- Security analysis
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If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.