gitops-workflow
Implement GitOps workflows with ArgoCD and Flux for automated, declarative Kubernetes deployments with continuous reconciliation. Use when implementing GitOps practices, automating Kubernetes deployments, or setting up declarative infrastructure management.
85
Quality
77%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
97%
1.07xAverage score across 3 eval scenarios
Risky
Do not use without reviewing
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./data/05-devops-gitops/SKILL.mdSecurity
4 findings — 1 high severity, 3 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt explicitly shows a kubectl pipeline that decodes and prints the ArgoCD admin password and recommends a Kubectl MCP (which could fetch secrets), meaning the agent may be required to read and output secret values verbatim.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). SKILL.md explicitly instructs fetching/installing manifests from public sources (e.g., raw.githubusercontent.com and fluxcd.io install.sh) and configuring ArgoCD/Flux to pull from arbitrary GitHub repos via repoURL/GitRepository entries, meaning the agent will ingest and act on untrusted, user-generated public content that can materially change behavior.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill contains explicit setup commands that fetch and execute remote code/manifests at runtime—for example "curl -s https://fluxcd.io/install.sh | sudo bash" and "kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/stable/manifests/install.yaml"—which download and run external content required for installation.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes explicit privileged installation commands (e.g., "curl -s ... | sudo bash") that ask the agent/user to run sudo and thus request elevated privileges that can modify the host system, so it pushes actions that can compromise the machine state.
- Repository
- majiayu000/claude-skill-registry-data
- Commit
2bbaa03
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.