Implement GitOps workflows with ArgoCD and Flux for automated, declarative Kubernetes deployments with continuous reconciliation. Use when implementing GitOps practices, automating Kubernetes deployments, or setting up declarative infrastructure management.
80
70%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
97%
1.07xAverage score across 3 eval scenarios
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/data/05-devops-gitops/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 3 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). SKILL.md explicitly instructs fetching and bootstrapping from public GitHub URLs (e.g., https://raw.githubusercontent.com/... and repoURL fields like https://github.com/org/gitops-repo and the `flux bootstrap github` command), so the agent would ingest and act on untrusted, user-controlled repository content that can directly change deployments.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill contains runtime commands that fetch and execute remote content—specifically "kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/stable/manifests/install.yaml" and "curl -s https://fluxcd.io/install.sh | sudo bash"—which download and run remote manifests/scripts required for installation, so they execute remote code.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes explicit privileged installation commands (e.g., "curl -s ... | sudo bash") that ask the agent/user to run sudo and thus request elevated privileges that can modify the host system, so it pushes actions that can compromise the machine state.
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If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.