Cross-platform desktop application framework combining Rust backend with web frontend, emphasizing security and performance
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npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/tauri/SKILL.mdThis skill uses a split structure for HIGH-RISK requirements:
Risk Level: HIGH
Justification: Tauri applications bridge web content with native system access. Improper IPC configuration, CSP bypasses, and capability mismanagement can lead to arbitrary code execution, file system access, and privilege escalation.
You are an expert in Tauri desktop application development with deep understanding of the security boundaries between web and native code. You configure applications with minimal permissions while maintaining functionality.
| Situation | Approach |
|---|---|
| Need filesystem access | Scope to specific directories, never root |
| Need shell execution | Disable by default, use allowlist if required |
| Need network access | Specify allowed domains in CSP |
| Custom IPC commands | Validate all inputs, check permissions |
| Sensitive operations | Require origin verification |
| Category | Version | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Tauri CLI | 2.0+ | Use 2.x for new projects |
| Tauri Core | 2.0+ | Significant security improvements over 1.x |
| Rust | 1.77.2+ | CVE-2024-24576 fix |
| Node.js | 20 LTS | For build tooling |
src-tauri/
├── Cargo.toml
├── tauri.conf.json # Main configuration
├── capabilities/ # Permission definitions
│ ├── default.json
│ └── admin.json
└── src/
└── main.rsRust Backend Test:
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_file_read_validates_path() {
let request = FileRequest { path: "../secret".to_string() };
assert!(request.validate().is_err(), "Should reject path traversal");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_async_command_returns_result() {
let result = process_data("valid input".to_string()).await;
assert!(result.is_ok());
}
}Frontend Vitest Test:
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest'
import { invoke } from '@tauri-apps/api/core'
vi.mock('@tauri-apps/api/core')
describe('Tauri IPC', () => {
it('invokes read_file command correctly', async () => {
vi.mocked(invoke).mockResolvedValue('file content')
const result = await invoke('read_file', { path: 'config.json' })
expect(result).toBe('file content')
})
})Write only the code necessary to make the test pass:
#[command]
pub async fn process_data(input: String) -> Result<String, String> {
// Minimum implementation to pass test
Ok(format!("Processed: {}", input))
}After tests pass, improve code structure without changing behavior:
# Rust tests and linting
cd src-tauri && cargo test
cd src-tauri && cargo clippy -- -D warnings
cd src-tauri && cargo audit
# Frontend tests
npm test
npm run typecheck// src-tauri/capabilities/default.json
{
"$schema": "../gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json",
"identifier": "default",
"description": "Default permissions for standard users",
"windows": ["main"],
"permissions": [
"core:event:default",
"core:window:default",
{
"identifier": "fs:read-files",
"allow": ["$APPDATA/*", "$RESOURCE/*"]
},
{
"identifier": "fs:write-files",
"allow": ["$APPDATA/*"]
}
]
}// tauri.conf.json
{
"app": {
"security": {
"csp": {
"default-src": "'self'",
"script-src": "'self'",
"style-src": "'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
"connect-src": "'self' https://api.example.com",
"object-src": "'none'",
"frame-ancestors": "'none'"
},
"freezePrototype": true
}
}
}use tauri::{command, AppHandle};
use validator::Validate;
#[derive(serde::Deserialize, Validate)]
pub struct FileRequest {
#[validate(length(min = 1, max = 255))]
path: String,
}
#[command]
pub async fn read_file(request: FileRequest, app: AppHandle) -> Result<String, String> {
request.validate().map_err(|e| format!("Validation error: {}", e))?;
let app_dir = app.path().app_data_dir().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
let full_path = app_dir.join(&request.path);
let canonical = dunce::canonicalize(&full_path).map_err(|_| "Invalid path")?;
// Security: ensure path is within app directory
if !canonical.starts_with(&app_dir) {
return Err("Access denied: path traversal detected".into());
}
std::fs::read_to_string(canonical).map_err(|e| format!("Failed: {}", e))
}use tauri::Window;
#[command]
pub async fn sensitive_operation(window: Window) -> Result<(), String> {
let url = window.url();
match url.origin() {
url::Origin::Tuple(scheme, host, _) => {
if scheme != "tauri" && scheme != "https" {
return Err("Invalid origin".into());
}
if host.to_string() != "localhost" && host.to_string() != "tauri.localhost" {
return Err("Invalid origin".into());
}
}
_ => return Err("Invalid origin".into()),
}
Ok(())
}use tauri_plugin_updater::UpdaterExt;
pub fn configure_updater(app: &mut tauri::App) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let handle = app.handle().clone();
tauri::async_runtime::spawn(async move {
let updater = handle.updater_builder()
.endpoints(vec!["https://releases.example.com/{{target}}/{{current_version}}".into()])
.pubkey("YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY_HERE")
.build()?;
if let Ok(Some(update)) = updater.check().await {
let _ = update.download_and_install(|_, _| {}, || {}).await;
}
Ok::<_, Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>(())
});
Ok(())
}For advanced patterns and plugin development, see
references/advanced-patterns.md
// BAD: Blocking the main thread
#[command]
fn process_file(path: String) -> Result<String, String> {
std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| e.to_string())
}
// GOOD: Async with tokio
#[command]
async fn process_file(path: String) -> Result<String, String> {
tokio::fs::read_to_string(path).await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())
}// BAD: Large nested structures
#[command]
fn get_all_data() -> Result<Vec<ComplexObject>, String> {
// Returns megabytes of data
}
// GOOD: Paginated responses with minimal fields
#[derive(serde::Serialize)]
struct DataPage { items: Vec<MinimalItem>, cursor: Option<String> }
#[command]
async fn get_data_page(cursor: Option<String>, limit: usize) -> Result<DataPage, String> {
// Returns small batches
}// BAD: No cleanup on window close
fn setup_handler(app: &mut App) {
let handle = app.handle().clone();
// Resources leak when window closes
}
// GOOD: Proper lifecycle management
fn setup_handler(app: &mut App) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let handle = app.handle().clone();
app.on_window_event(move |window, event| {
if let tauri::WindowEvent::Destroyed = event {
// Cleanup resources for this window
cleanup_window_resources(window.label());
}
});
Ok(())
}// BAD: Cloning large state on every access
#[command]
fn get_state(state: State<'_, AppState>) -> AppState {
state.inner().clone() // Expensive clone
}
// GOOD: Use Arc for shared state, return references
use std::sync::Arc;
#[command]
fn get_config(state: State<'_, Arc<AppConfig>>) -> Arc<AppConfig> {
Arc::clone(state.inner()) // Cheap Arc clone
}// BAD: Creating windows without reuse
async function showDialog() {
await new WebviewWindow('dialog', { url: '/dialog' }) // Creates new each time
}
// GOOD: Reuse existing windows
import { WebviewWindow } from '@tauri-apps/api/webviewWindow'
async function showDialog() {
const existing = await WebviewWindow.getByLabel('dialog')
if (existing) {
await existing.show()
await existing.setFocus()
} else {
await new WebviewWindow('dialog', { url: '/dialog' })
}
}Research Date: 2025-11-20
| CVE ID | Severity | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-35222 | HIGH | iFrames bypass origin checks | Upgrade to 1.6.7+ or 2.0.0-beta.20+ |
| CVE-2024-24576 | CRITICAL | Rust command injection | Upgrade Rust to 1.77.2+ |
| CVE-2023-46115 | MEDIUM | Updater keys leaked via Vite | Remove TAURI_ from envPrefix |
| CVE-2023-34460 | MEDIUM | Filesystem scope bypass | Upgrade to 1.4.1+ |
| CVE-2022-46171 | HIGH | Permissive glob patterns | Use explicit path allowlists |
See
references/security-examples.mdfor complete CVE details and mitigation code
| OWASP Category | Risk | Key Mitigations |
|---|---|---|
| A01 Broken Access Control | CRITICAL | Capability system, IPC validation |
| A02 Cryptographic Failures | HIGH | Secure updater signatures, TLS |
| A03 Injection | HIGH | Validate IPC inputs, CSP |
| A04 Insecure Design | HIGH | Minimal capabilities |
| A05 Security Misconfiguration | CRITICAL | Restrictive CSP, frozen prototype |
| A06 Vulnerable Components | HIGH | Keep Tauri updated |
| A07 Auth Failures | MEDIUM | Origin verification |
| A08 Data Integrity Failures | HIGH | Signed updates |
use validator::Validate;
#[derive(serde::Deserialize, Validate)]
pub struct UserCommand {
#[validate(length(min = 1, max = 100))]
pub name: String,
#[validate(range(min = 1, max = 1000))]
pub count: u32,
#[validate(custom(function = "validate_path"))]
pub file_path: Option<String>,
}
fn validate_path(path: &str) -> Result<(), validator::ValidationError> {
if path.contains("..") || path.contains("~") {
return Err(validator::ValidationError::new("invalid_path"));
}
Ok(())
}// NEVER in vite.config.ts - leaks TAURI_PRIVATE_KEY!
{ "envPrefix": ["VITE_", "TAURI_"] }
// GOOD: Only expose VITE_ variables
{ "envPrefix": ["VITE_"] }// Load secrets at runtime, never hardcode
fn get_api_key() -> Result<String, Error> {
std::env::var("API_KEY").map_err(|_| Error::Configuration("API_KEY not set".into()))
}use thiserror::Error;
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum AppError {
#[error("Invalid input")]
Validation(#[from] validator::ValidationErrors),
#[error("Operation not permitted")]
PermissionDenied,
#[error("Internal error")]
Internal(#[source] anyhow::Error),
}
// Safe serialization - never expose internal details to frontend
impl serde::Serialize for AppError {
fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where S: serde::Serializer {
tracing::error!("Error: {:?}", self);
serializer.serialize_str(&self.to_string())
}
}npx tauri info # Check configuration
cd src-tauri && cargo audit # Audit dependencies
npx tauri build --debug # Check capability issues
npm run test:security # Test IPC boundaries#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_path_traversal_blocked() {
let request = FileRequest { path: "../../../etc/passwd".to_string() };
assert!(request.validate().is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_unauthorized_access_blocked() {
let result = sensitive_operation(mock_window_bad_origin()).await;
assert!(result.unwrap_err().contains("Invalid origin"));
}
}For comprehensive test examples, see
references/security-examples.md
// NEVER: Grants access to entire filesystem
{ "permissions": ["fs:default", "fs:scope-home"] }
// ALWAYS: Scope to specific directories
{ "permissions": [{ "identifier": "fs:read-files", "allow": ["$APPDATA/myapp/*"] }] }// NEVER
{ "security": { "csp": null } }
// ALWAYS
{ "security": { "csp": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'" } }// NEVER
{ "permissions": ["shell:allow-execute"] }
// IF NEEDED: Strict allowlist only
{
"permissions": [{
"identifier": "shell:allow-execute",
"allow": [{ "name": "git", "cmd": "git", "args": ["status"] }]
}]
}// NEVER - leaks private keys!
export default { envPrefix: ['VITE_', 'TAURI_'] }
// ALWAYS
export default { envPrefix: ['VITE_'] }// NEVER: Direct use of user input
#[command]
fn read_file(path: String) -> String { std::fs::read_to_string(path).unwrap() }
// ALWAYS: Validate and scope
#[command]
fn read_file(request: ValidatedFileRequest) -> Result<String, String> { /* ... */ }freezePrototype: true enabledcargo audit passesYour goal is to create Tauri applications that are:
Security Reminder:
For attack scenarios and threat modeling, see
references/threat-model.md
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