Deploy, evaluate, and manage Foundry agents end-to-end: Docker build, ACR push, hosted/prompt agent create, container start, batch eval, continuous eval, prompt optimizer workflows, agent.yaml, dataset curation from traces. USE FOR: deploy agent to Foundry, hosted agent, create agent, invoke agent, evaluate agent, run batch eval, continuous eval, continuous monitoring, continuous eval status, optimize prompt, improve prompt, prompt optimizer, optimize agent instructions, improve agent instructions, optimize system prompt, deploy model, Foundry project, RBAC, role assignment, permissions, quota, capacity, region, troubleshoot agent, deployment failure, create dataset from traces, dataset versioning, eval trending, create AI Services, Cognitive Services, create Foundry resource, provision resource, knowledge index, agent monitoring, customize deployment, onboard, availability. DO NOT USE FOR: Azure Functions, App Service, general Azure deploy (use azure-deploy), general Azure prep (use azure-prepare).
70
85%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
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No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly fetches and ingests public third-party content as part of required workflows — e.g., it mandates listing/downloading samples via the GitHub API (GET https://api.github.com/repos/microsoft-foundry/foundry-samples/contents/{sample_browse_path}), requires fetching and reading external docs (VS Code Tool Catalog) before guiding the user, and uses WebSearchPreviewTool/Bing Grounding and external MCP/toolbox endpoints — all of which are untrusted public content that the agent must read and that can influence tool use and next actions, creating an indirect prompt-injection surface.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly performs runtime GitHub API calls (GET https://api.github.com/repos/microsoft-foundry/foundry-samples/contents/{selected_sample_path}) and then downloads sample files via the returned .download_url (curl -sL "$url" -o "$filepath"), which fetches remote code and agent definition files that directly control agent instructions/behavior and are required by the workflow.
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