Uses the Linux Audit framework (auditd) with ausearch and aureport utilities to detect intrusion attempts, unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious system activity. Covers audit rule configuration, log querying, timeline reconstruction, and integration with SIEM platforms. Activates for requests involving auditd analysis, Linux audit log investigation, ausearch queries, aureport summaries, or host-based intrusion detection on Linux.
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/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, or SSH keysDo not use for network-level intrusion detection; use Suricata or Zeek for network traffic analysis. Auditd operates at the kernel level on individual hosts.
auditd package installed and the audit daemon running (systemctl status auditd)/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules or loaded with auditctlexecve, open, connect, ptrace, etc.)/var/log/audit/audit.log)Confirm the audit system is running and check the current rule set:
# Check auditd service status
systemctl status auditd
# Show current audit rules loaded in the kernel
auditctl -l
# Show audit daemon configuration
cat /etc/audit/auditd.conf | grep -E "log_file|max_log_file|num_logs|space_left_action"
# Check if the audit backlog is being exceeded (dropped events)
auditctl -sIf the backlog limit is being reached, increase it:
auditctl -b 8192Add rules that target common intrusion indicators. Place these in /etc/audit/rules.d/intrusion.rules:
# Monitor credential files for unauthorized reads or modifications
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k credential_access
-w /etc/shadow -p rwa -k credential_access
-w /etc/gshadow -p rwa -k credential_access
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k privilege_escalation
-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k privilege_escalation
# Monitor SSH configuration and authorized keys
-w /etc/ssh/sshd_config -p wa -k sshd_config_change
-w /root/.ssh/authorized_keys -p wa -k ssh_key_tampering
# Monitor user and group management commands
-w /usr/sbin/useradd -p x -k user_management
-w /usr/sbin/usermod -p x -k user_management
-w /usr/sbin/groupadd -p x -k user_management
# Detect process injection via ptrace
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x4 -k process_injection
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x5 -k process_injection
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x6 -k process_injection
# Monitor execution of programs from unusual directories
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F exe=/tmp -k exec_from_tmp
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F exe=/dev/shm -k exec_from_shm
# Detect kernel module loading (rootkit installation)
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S finit_module -k kernel_module_load
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -k kernel_module_remove
-w /sbin/insmod -p x -k kernel_module_tool
-w /sbin/modprobe -p x -k kernel_module_tool
# Monitor network socket creation for reverse shells
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=2 -k network_socket_created
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -F a0=2 -k network_connection
# Detect cron job modifications (persistence)
-w /etc/crontab -p wa -k cron_persistence
-w /etc/cron.d/ -p wa -k cron_persistence
-w /var/spool/cron/ -p wa -k cron_persistence
# Monitor log deletion or tampering
-w /var/log/ -p wa -k log_tamperingReload rules after editing:
augenrules --load
auditctl -l | wc -l # Confirm rule countUse ausearch to query the audit log for specific events:
# Search for all failed login attempts in the last 24 hours
ausearch -m USER_LOGIN --success no -ts recent
# Search for commands executed by a specific user
ausearch -ua 1001 -m EXECVE -ts today
# Search for all file access events on /etc/shadow
ausearch -f /etc/shadow -ts this-week
# Search for privilege escalation via sudo
ausearch -m USER_CMD -ts today
# Search for kernel module loading events
ausearch -k kernel_module_load -ts this-month
# Search for processes executed from /tmp (common attack staging)
ausearch -k exec_from_tmp -ts this-week
# Search for SSH key modifications
ausearch -k ssh_key_tampering -ts this-month
# Search for a specific event by audit event ID
ausearch -a 12345
# Search events in a specific time range
ausearch -ts 03/15/2026 08:00:00 -te 03/15/2026 18:00:00
# Interpret syscall numbers and format output readably
ausearch -k credential_access -i -ts todayUse aureport to produce aggregate summaries for triage:
# Summary of all authentication events
aureport -au -ts this-week --summary
# Report of all failed events (login, access, etc.)
aureport --failed --summary -ts today
# Report of executable runs
aureport -x --summary -ts today
# Report of all anomaly events (segfaults, promiscuous mode, etc.)
aureport --anomaly -ts this-week
# Report of file access events
aureport -f --summary -ts today
# Report of all events by key (maps to your custom rule keys)
aureport -k --summary -ts this-month
# Report of all system calls
aureport -s --summary -ts today
# Report of events grouped by user
aureport -u --summary -ts this-week
# Detailed time-based event report for timeline building
aureport -ts 03/15/2026 08:00:00 -te 03/15/2026 18:00:00 --summaryCombine ausearch queries to build a chronological narrative:
# Step 5a: Identify the initial access timestamp
ausearch -m USER_LOGIN -ua 0 --success yes -ts this-week -i | head -50
# Step 5b: Trace what the attacker did after gaining access
# Get all events from the compromised account within the incident window
ausearch -ua <UID> -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -te "03/15/2026 18:00:00" -i \
| aureport -f -i
# Step 5c: Extract all commands executed during the incident window
ausearch -m EXECVE -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -te "03/15/2026 18:00:00" -i
# Step 5d: Check for persistence mechanisms installed
ausearch -k cron_persistence -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -i
ausearch -k ssh_key_tampering -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -i
# Step 5e: Check for lateral movement (outbound connections)
ausearch -k network_connection -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -iConfigure audisp-remote or auditbeat to ship logs to a central SIEM for correlation:
# Option A: Using audisp-remote plugin
# Edit /etc/audit/plugins.d/au-remote.conf
active = yes
direction = out
path = /sbin/audisp-remote
type = always
# Configure remote target in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf
remote_server = siem.internal.corp
port = 6514
transport = tcp
# Option B: Using Elastic Auditbeat
# Install auditbeat and configure /etc/auditbeat/auditbeat.yml
# Auditbeat reads directly from the kernel audit framework| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| auditd | The Linux Audit daemon that receives audit events from the kernel and writes them to /var/log/audit/audit.log |
| auditctl | Command-line utility to control the audit system: add/remove rules, check status, set backlog size |
| ausearch | Query tool that searches audit logs by message type, user, file, key, time range, or event ID |
| aureport | Reporting tool that generates aggregate summaries of audit events for triage and compliance |
| audit rule key (-k) | A user-defined label attached to an audit rule, enabling fast filtering of related events with ausearch and aureport |
| syscall auditing | Kernel-level monitoring of system calls (execve, open, connect, ptrace) that captures process and file activity |
| augenrules | Utility that merges all files in /etc/audit/rules.d/ into /etc/audit/audit.rules and loads them into the kernel |
auditctl -l returns expected rule count)auditctl -s shows backlog: 0 or low value, lost: 0)ausearch -k <key> -ts today returns results)touch /etc/shadow generates an event)/etc/audit/rules.d/, not only via auditctl)c15f73d
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