automating-ioc-enrichment
Automates the enrichment of raw indicators of compromise with multi-source threat intelligence context using SOAR platforms, Python pipelines, or TIP playbooks to reduce analyst triage time and standardize enrichment outputs. Use when building automated enrichment workflows integrated with SIEM alerts, email submission pipelines, or bulk IOC processing from threat feeds. Activates for requests involving SOAR enrichment, Cortex XSOAR, Splunk SOAR, TheHive, Python enrichment pipelines, or automated IOC processing.
85
82%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Risky
Do not use without reviewing
Security
2 findings — 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The prompt's example code and prerequisites require passing API keys (vt_key, abuse_key, shodan_key) into requests headers and lists "API keys" as required, which encourages embedding secret values verbatim in generated code/commands instead of using environment variables or secure credential stores.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's SKILL.md and scripts/agent.py explicitly fetch and parse data from public third-party sources (VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, Shodan, MISP, URLScan, etc.) and then use those untrusted, user-contributed API responses to compute composite confidence scores that drive playbook decisions (e.g., priority routing and auto-close), so external content can materially alter agent behavior.
- Repository
- mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
- Commit
c15f73d
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.