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building-adversary-infrastructure-tracking-system

Build an automated system to track adversary infrastructure using passive DNS, certificate transparency, WHOIS data, and IP enrichment to map and monitor threat actor command-and-control networks.

52

Quality

58%

Does it follow best practices?

Impact

No eval scenarios have been run

SecuritybySnyk

Risky

Do not use without reviewing

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npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/building-adversary-infrastructure-tracking-system/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

2 findings — 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.

High

W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions

What this means

The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.

Why it was flagged

Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The prompt includes explicit API key placeholders and code that injects those keys directly into HTTP request headers and instantiated objects, which encourages providing and embedding secret values verbatim in generated code/requests (exfiltration risk).

Report incorrect finding
Medium

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.75). The required runtime workflow calls external APIs (e.g., `query_crtsh()` to `https://crt.sh/?...&output=json` and `query_urlhaus()` / `query_threatfox()`), and the returned JSON fields (like certificate SANs / domain names and other text values) are ingested into the agent’s in-memory structures and then into the generated report, which would be passed into the LLM context as free-form text if the agent uses that report for prompting—these are outsider-authored public web/API content.

Repository
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

Is this your skill?

If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.