Builds vendor-agnostic detection rules using the Sigma rule format for threat detection across SIEM platforms including Splunk, Elastic, and Microsoft Sentinel. Use when creating portable detection logic from threat intelligence, mapping rules to MITRE ATT&CK techniques, or converting community Sigma rules into platform-specific queries using sigmac or pySigma backends.
90
88%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Use this skill when:
Do not use for real-time streaming detection (Sigma is for batch/scheduled searches) or when the target SIEM has native detection features that Sigma cannot express (e.g., Splunk RBA risk scoring).
pySigma and appropriate backend (pySigma-backend-splunk, pySigma-backend-elasticsearch, pySigma-backend-microsoft365defender)git clone https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma.gitStart with a threat report or ATT&CK technique. Example: detecting Mimikatz credential dumping (T1003.001 — LSASS Memory):
title: Mimikatz Credential Dumping via LSASS Access
id: 0d894093-71bc-43c3-8d63-bf520e73a7c5
status: stable
level: high
description: Detects process accessing lsass.exe memory, indicative of credential dumping tools like Mimikatz
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
author: mahipal
date: 2024/03/15
modified: 2024/03/15
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
GrantedAccess|contains:
- '0x1010'
- '0x1038'
- '0x1fffff'
- '0x40'
filter_main_svchost:
SourceImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
filter_main_csrss:
SourceImage|endswith: '\csrss.exe'
filter_main_wininit:
SourceImage|endswith: '\wininit.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate security tools accessing LSASS
- Windows Defender scanning
- CrowdStrike Falcon sensorUse sigma check to validate the rule:
# Install pySigma and validators
pip install pySigma pySigma-validators-sigmaHQ
# Validate rule
sigma check rule.ymlAlternatively, validate with Python:
from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
from sigma.validators.core import SigmaValidator
rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open("rule.yml").read())
validator = SigmaValidator()
issues = validator.validate_rule(rule)
for issue in issues:
print(f"{issue.severity}: {issue.message}")Convert to Splunk SPL:
from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
from sigma.backends.splunk import SplunkBackend
from sigma.pipelines.splunk import splunk_windows_pipeline
pipeline = splunk_windows_pipeline()
backend = SplunkBackend(pipeline)
rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open("rule.yml").read())
splunk_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(splunk_query[0])Output:
TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe" (GrantedAccess="*0x1010*" OR GrantedAccess="*0x1038*"
OR GrantedAccess="*0x1fffff*" OR GrantedAccess="*0x40*")
NOT (SourceImage="*\\svchost.exe") NOT (SourceImage="*\\csrss.exe")
NOT (SourceImage="*\\wininit.exe")Convert to Elastic Query (Lucene):
from sigma.backends.elasticsearch import LuceneBackend
from sigma.pipelines.elasticsearch import ecs_windows_pipeline
pipeline = ecs_windows_pipeline()
backend = LuceneBackend(pipeline)
elastic_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(elastic_query[0])Convert to Microsoft Sentinel KQL:
from sigma.backends.microsoft365defender import Microsoft365DefenderBackend
backend = Microsoft365DefenderBackend()
kql_query = backend.convert_rule(rule)
print(kql_query[0])Tag every rule with ATT&CK technique IDs in the tags field:
tags:
- attack.credential_access # Tactic
- attack.t1003.001 # Sub-technique
- attack.t1003 # Parent techniqueTrack detection coverage using the ATT&CK Navigator:
import json
# Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer from Sigma rules
layer = {
"name": "SOC Detection Coverage",
"versions": {"attack": "14", "navigator": "4.9", "layer": "4.5"},
"domain": "enterprise-attack",
"techniques": []
}
# Parse Sigma rules directory for technique tags
import os
from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
for root, dirs, files in os.walk("sigma/rules/windows/"):
for f in files:
if f.endswith(".yml"):
rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml(open(os.path.join(root, f)).read())
for tag in rule.tags:
if str(tag).startswith("attack.t"):
technique_id = str(tag).replace("attack.", "").upper()
layer["techniques"].append({
"techniqueID": technique_id,
"color": "#31a354",
"score": 1
})
with open("coverage_layer.json", "w") as f:
json.dump(layer, f, indent=2)Create test data and validate the rule catches the expected events:
# Use sigma test framework
sigma test rule.yml --target splunk --pipeline splunk_windows
# Or manually test in Splunk with sample data
# Upload Sysmon process_access log with known Mimikatz signatureValidate false positive rate by running against 7 days of production data in a non-alerting saved search.
Deploy the converted query as a scheduled search or correlation rule:
Splunk ES Correlation Search:
| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process_name="*\\lsass.exe"
by Processes.src, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| where count > 0Elastic Security Rule (TOML format):
[rule]
name = "LSASS Memory Access - Credential Dumping"
description = "Detects suspicious access to LSASS process memory"
risk_score = 73
severity = "high"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.action == "access" and
process.name == "lsass.exe" and
not process.executable : ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\csrss.exe")
'''
[rule.threat]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"Store rules in Git with automated testing:
# .github/workflows/sigma-ci.yml
name: Sigma Rule CI
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
validate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: '3.11'
- run: pip install pySigma pySigma-validators-sigmaHQ
- run: sigma check rules/
- run: sigma convert -t splunk -p splunk_windows rules/ > /dev/null| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Sigma | Vendor-agnostic detection rule format (YAML-based) that compiles to SIEM-specific queries via backends |
| pySigma | Python library replacing legacy sigmac for rule conversion, validation, and pipeline processing |
| Backend | pySigma plugin that translates Sigma detection logic into a target platform query language (SPL, KQL, Lucene) |
| Pipeline | Field mapping configuration that translates generic Sigma field names to SIEM-specific field names |
| Logsource | Sigma rule section defining the category (process_creation, network_connection) and product (windows, linux) of the target data |
| Detection-as-Code | Practice of managing detection rules in version control with CI/CD testing and automated deployment |
SIGMA RULE DEPLOYMENT REPORT
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Rule ID: 0d894093-71bc-43c3-8d63-bf520e73a7c5
Title: Mimikatz Credential Dumping via LSASS Access
ATT&CK: T1003.001 - LSASS Memory
Severity: High
Status: Deployed to Production
Conversions:
Splunk SPL: PASS — Saved search "sigma_lsass_access" created
Elastic EQL: PASS — Detection rule ID elastic-0d894093 enabled
Sentinel KQL: PASS — Analytics rule deployed via ARM template
Testing:
True Positives: 4/4 test cases matched
False Positives: 2 in 7-day backtest (svchost edge case — filter added)
Performance: Avg execution 3.2s on 50M events/dayc15f73d
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