This skill should be used when modeling agent mental states with BDI concepts: beliefs, desires, intentions, RDF-to-belief transformations, rational agency traces, cognitive agents, BDI ontologies, and neuro-symbolic AI integration.
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Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.70). The skill’s runtime LAG workflow takes **external RDF context** (user-provided or otherwise supplied) and injects it verbatim into the LLM prompt as `{context}` (“## Context to Model: {context}”), so if that RDF contains **outsider-authored free-text literals** (e.g., comments/issue text/web page text) they become readable prose in the LLM context via the prompt.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The BDILogicAugmentedGenerator loads and parses an ontology_path at runtime and serializes/injects that ontology into the LLM prompt—so if that path is an external URL (e.g., https://w3id.org/fossr/ontology/bdi/) the remote content would directly control agent prompts.
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