Use when packaging a Rust project with Cargo.toml, when an element needs cargo2 sources for offline builds, or when generating cargo dependency lists for BuildStream
85
82%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). Yes — SKILL.md explicitly requires cloning and reading upstream GitHub repos and Cargo.lock files and generating/using cargo2 sources that reference crates.io registry entries and git-hosted repos (e.g., "sources: kind: git_repo url: github:..." and the "python3 files/scripts/generate_cargo_sources.py path/to/Cargo.lock" step), so the agent would fetch and interpret untrusted public third-party content that can materially change which dependencies/tools are used.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt explicitly instructs installing binaries into system paths (e.g., /usr/bin), including setting the setuid bit and replacing /usr/bin/sudo (overlap-whitelist), which would modify privileged system files and can grant elevated capabilities, so it poses a high risk of compromising the host state.
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