coding-agent
Delegate coding tasks to Codex, Claude Code, or Pi agents via background process. Use when: (1) building/creating new features or apps, (2) reviewing PRs (spawn in temp dir), (3) refactoring large codebases, (4) iterative coding that needs file exploration. NOT for: simple one-liner fixes (just edit), reading code (use read tool), thread-bound ACP harness requests in chat (for example spawn/run Codex or Claude Code in a Discord thread; use sessions_spawn with runtime:"acp"), or any work in ~/clawd workspace (never spawn agents here). Claude Code: use --print --permission-mode bypassPermissions (no PTY). Codex/Pi/OpenCode: pty:true required.
90
88%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
95%
1.72xAverage score across 3 eval scenarios
Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The workflow references reading/cloning GitHub repositories (line 138), which can ingest outsider-authored free text from external PRs or repositories.
- Repository
- qsimeon/openclaw-engaging
- Commit
4467e04
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.