coding-agent
Delegate coding tasks to Codex, Claude Code, or Pi agents via background process. Use when: (1) building/creating new features or apps, (2) reviewing PRs (spawn in temp dir), (3) refactoring large codebases, (4) iterative coding that needs file exploration. NOT for: simple one-liner fixes (just edit), reading code (use read tool), thread-bound ACP harness requests in chat (for example spawn/run Codex or Claude Code in a Discord thread; use sessions_spawn with runtime:"acp"), or any work in ~/clawd workspace (never spawn agents here). Claude Code: use --print --permission-mode bypassPermissions (no PTY). Codex/Pi/OpenCode: pty:true required.
90
88%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
95%
1.72xAverage score across 3 eval scenarios
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
3 findings — 3 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). Yes — SKILL.md explicitly instructs cloning and fetching public GitHub repositories and PR refs (e.g., "git clone https://github.com/user/repo.git $REVIEW_DIR" and "git fetch origin '+refs/pull/*/head:refs/remotes/origin/pr/*'") and then running coding agents (codex/claude/pi) to read, review, modify, and post results, so untrusted, user-generated third‑party content is ingested and can directly influence tool actions.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill instructs cloning and running against a remote repository at runtime (git clone https://github.com/user/repo.git), which will fetch external code that the agent reads to form prompts/decisions and may be installed/executed (e.g., pnpm install), so the fetched content can directly control agent behavior and execute remote code.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.80). The prompt explicitly encourages bypassing sandboxing and permission checks (e.g., --permission-mode bypassPermissions, --dangerously-skip-permissions, --yolo, and an "elevated" host option) and instructs running agents on the host with PTY/background control, which enables the agent to modify the machine state and evade safety controls.
- Repository
- qsimeon/openclaw-engaging
- Commit
4467e04
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.