agent-email-inbox
Use when building any system where email content triggers actions — AI agent inboxes, automated support handlers, email-to-task pipelines, or any workflow processing untrusted inbound email. Always use this skill when the user wants to receive emails and act on them programmatically, even if they don't mention "agent" — the skill contains critical security patterns (sender allowlists, content filtering, sandboxed processing) that prevent untrusted email from controlling your system.
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Low
Low-risk findings worth noting
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tessl review fix ./skills/agent-email-inbox/SKILL.mdLow
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
This skill’s runtime workflow exposes the AI agent to outsider-authored email bodies via the webhook endpoint (`POST` → `resend.webhooks.verify()` → `resend.emails.receiving.get(event.data.email_id)` → `processEmailForAgent(...)` → `agent.processEmail({... body: emailContent.text || emailContent.html })`).
- Repository
- resend/resend-skills
- Commit
865a368
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.