Use when building any system where email content triggers actions — AI agent inboxes, automated support handlers, email-to-task pipelines, or any workflow processing untrusted inbound email. Always use this skill when the user wants to receive emails and act on them programmatically, even if they don't mention "agent" — the skill contains critical security patterns (sender allowlists, content filtering, sandboxed processing) that prevent untrusted email from controlling your system.
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Low-risk findings worth noting
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow sets up an email inbox webhook receiver that processes inbound external emails from anyone on the internet.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The installation instructions use curl to fetch and execute a remote shell script from tailscale.com (`curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh`), which constitutes an unverifiable runtime external dependency from a third-party source.
resend/resend-skills
56d7bbf
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