Comprehensive Flow Nexus platform management - authentication, sandboxes, app deployment, payments, and challenges
75
66%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
94%
1.95xAverage score across 3 eval scenarios
High
Do not use without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./.claude/skills/flow-nexus-platform/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings: 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt repeatedly shows API keys, tokens, passwords, and DB URLs as parameters (e.g., env_vars.API_KEY, anthropic_key "sk-ant-...", database_url "postgres://user:pass...", login password fields) which instruct the agent to accept and embed secret values verbatim in generated calls and code, creating exfiltration risk.
The skill is specifically designed for direct financial operations, giving the agent the ability to move money or execute financial transactions — such as payment processing, cryptocurrency operations, banking integrations, or market order execution.
Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill includes explicit, purpose-built payment functions and credit-management APIs. Notably it provides mcp__flow-nexus__create_payment_link (returns a secure Stripe payment URL), mcp__flow-nexus__configure_auto_refill (automatically purchases credits when threshold met), and mcp__flow-nexus__app_store_earn_ruv (programmatically grants rUv credits). These are specific payment/credit operations (payment gateway integration and automated purchases/credit adjustments), not generic HTTP or browser tooling, so it grants direct financial execution capability.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly fetches and uses user-published apps/templates and external repositories (e.g., App Store calls like mcp__flow-nexus__app_search, mcp__flow-nexus__template_get/template_deploy and sandbox startup scripts that git clone GitHub or sandbox_execute examples that fetch arbitrary URLs), meaning untrusted third‑party content is ingested and can directly influence deployments and tool actions.
d069fff
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