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github-code-review

Comprehensive GitHub code review with AI-powered swarm coordination

49

3.69x
Quality

28%

Does it follow best practices?

Impact

85%

3.69x

Average score across 3 eval scenarios

SecuritybySnyk

Critical

Do not install without reviewing

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npx tessl skill review --optimize ./.claude/skills/github-code-review/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

2 findings — 1 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.

Critical

E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts

What this means

Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.

Why it was flagged

Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill includes an HTTP webhook handler that execSyncs unsanitized GitHub event/comment content (remote user-controlled input) and features auto-fix/auto-merge automation that can commit/push changes—together these are explicit remote code-execution/backdoor primitives that could be abused to run arbitrary commands, exfiltrate secrets, or inject malicious code into repositories.

Report incorrect finding
Medium

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.95). The skill explicitly ingests untrusted, user-generated GitHub content (e.g., PR bodies, diffs, and PR comments via commands like `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff` and the webhook handler that runs `execSync` on `event.comment.body`) and uses that content to direct agent actions and run commands, which could enable indirect prompt injection.

Repository
ruvnet/ruvector
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

Is this your skill?

If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.