github-code-review
Comprehensive GitHub code review with AI-powered swarm coordination
56
39%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
85%
3.69xAverage score across 3 eval scenarios
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./.claude/skills/github-code-review/SKILL.mdThe canonical home for this skill is github-code-review in ruvnet/agentic-flow
Security
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill includes an HTTP webhook handler that execSyncs unsanitized GitHub event/comment content (remote user-controlled input) and features auto-fix/auto-merge automation that can commit/push changes—together these are explicit remote code-execution/backdoor primitives that could be abused to run arbitrary commands, exfiltrate secrets, or inject malicious code into repositories.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.95). The skill explicitly ingests untrusted, user-generated GitHub content (e.g., PR bodies, diffs, and PR comments via commands like `gh pr view`, `gh pr diff` and the webhook handler that runs `execSync` on `event.comment.body`) and uses that content to direct agent actions and run commands, which could enable indirect prompt injection.
- Repository
- ruvnet/ruvector
- Commit
6a6c39e
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.