Scrape leads from multiple platforms using Apify Actors.
57
48%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/apify-lead-generation/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly fetches actor READMEs via mcpc (Step 2 in SKILL.md) and run_actor.js calls the Apify API to download dataset items and display top results (downloadResults/displayQuickAnswer), so the agent ingests and interprets untrusted public web/social scraped content as part of its required workflow, which could contain instruction-like content that influences subsequent actions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill issues runtime requests to Apify endpoints (e.g., https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/.../runs?token=... and dataset/item URLs, and also invokes mcp.apify.com via mcpc) which start and interact with remote Apify actors (i.e., execute remote code) and are required for the skill to function, so these external URLs present a clear runtime remote-code execution dependency.
b938655
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.