autonomous-agent-patterns
Design patterns for building autonomous coding agents, inspired by [Cline](https://github.com/cline/cline) and [OpenAI Codex](https://github.com/openai/codex).
33
18%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Risky
Do not use without reviewing
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/autonomous-agent-patterns/SKILL.mdSecurity
4 findings — 1 high severity, 3 medium severity. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's patterns (read_file, ContextManager.add_file/add_folder, tool outputs added to history, run_command/type_text) instruct the agent to ingest and include raw file/URL/command contents in prompts and tool calls without redaction, enabling secrets to be handled and potentially emitted verbatim.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk)
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill fetches and ingests arbitrary public web content—e.g., ContextManager.add_url (requests.get/html_to_markdown), BrowserTool.open_url and get_page_content, and VisualAgent.describe_page/find_and_click—which the agent is expected to read/interpret and act on (including clicking or formatting that content into prompts), so untrusted third-party content can materially influence agent behavior.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The ContextManager.add_url method performs requests.get(url) at runtime and converts the fetched page into markdown that is injected into the agent prompt (i.e., any external URL passed to add_url — fetched via requests.get(url) — can directly control prompts), so this is a runtime external dependency that controls prompts.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill defines file-write and edit tools (write_file, edit_file, MCP server creation) that operate on arbitrary paths and execute code/commands with only heuristic approval or limited sandboxing, which can modify system files and machine state even without explicit sudo prompts.
- Repository
- sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills
- Commit
d739c8b
- Audited
- Security analysis
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