Conduct comprehensive security assessments of cloud infrastructure across Microsoft Azure, Amazon Web Services (AWS), and Google Cloud Platform (GCP).
53
61%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
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tessl review fix ./skills/cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This content contains explicit, actionable offensive cloud-attack instructions (secret exfiltration, credential theft, remote command execution, and creation of persistent backdoors/service principals/access keys) and is high risk for malicious abuse.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill contains commands that pass secrets directly on the command line (e.g., --secret_access_key, --password) and scripts that print user property values matching "*password*" or retrieve Key Vault secrets, which would require the agent to handle or embed secret values verbatim if real secrets are supplied.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill explicitly instructs running sudo-enabled installers and using sudo to read and copy other users' home directories on the host (e.g., sudo ./aws/install and sudo find/cp), which directs modification and privileged access of the machine the agent runs on.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow in SKILL.md ingests untrusted free text via user/attacker-supplied target identifiers (e.g., “exact target URL, IP, account, or resource” in the mandatory confirmation gate) which then drive runtime commands such as curl to Microsoft/Azure/AWS/GCP endpoints and authentication/enumeration flows.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill's prerequisites include runtime commands that download and execute remote installers (https://awscli.amazonaws.com/awscli-exe-linux-x86_64.zip and https://sdk.cloud.google.com), so those URLs fetch remote code that is executed and are required dependencies.
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